 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Welch2/5/2004
at the attempted criminal sexual conduct did occur in the presence of a child"; and (3) that Welch was a dangerous offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095 (2002). Based on these findings, the court sentenced Welch to the statutory maximum of 150 months for attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct and made the two sentences consecutive.
The court of appeals upheld the convictions. Welch, 2002 WL 1013152, at *2-*5. It also rejected most of Welch's arguments regarding sentencing, holding that " verall, appellant's 195-month sentence is fair," but reversed in part and remanded "for the limited purpose of having the sentence reconsidered in light of" Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. App.), aff'd, 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001). Welch, 2002 WL 1013152, at *4. The state did not seek review of the remanded issue.
I.
Welch argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict him of attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct because the state failed to prove that he intended to accomplish sexual contact with S.V.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this court's inquiry is limited to whether the fact finder could have reasonably concluded that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1993). The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assumes that the fact finder believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. Id.
The district court found that Welch "intended to remove, or touch, the clothing covering the immediate area of one or more of omplainant's intimate parts." The court based this finding upon Welch's past actions, as revealed in the Spreigl evidence, the "discernable sexual overtone" of Welch's initial conversation with S.V., and the position of Welch's body on top of S.V. during the attack.
Welch argues that the state "failed to prove that intended to accomplish sexual contact." He disputes the court's findings regarding any "sexual overtone" and argues that the Spreigl evidence actually supports his claim because he was not convicted of a sex crime in the prior incidents and because there is no evidence that he ever touched the "intimate parts" of the victims of the incidents. The evidence of the prior attacks, Welch argues, supports his assertions that he has never intended to rape or have sexual contact with the women he "confronts."
Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is defined as follows:
A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
(e) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and
(i) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact * * *.
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1. For these purposes, "sexual contact" is defined as follows:
any of the following acts committed without the complainant's consent, * * * and committed with sexual or aggressive intent:
(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's intimate parts, or
(iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts.
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a) (2002).
"Attempt" is defined as follows:
Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime * * *.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Minnesota Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|