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Anderson v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.2/10/2004
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED.
Crahan and Cohen, J., concurs
Opinion:
Keith Anderson ("Anderson") appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Shelter Mutual Insurance Company ("Shelter") and against him on each party's respective motions for summary judgment. Anderson argues on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) entering summary judgment in favor of Shelter and against him because the Circuit Court of Jefferson County ("Jefferson County") had jurisdiction to enter its June 27, 2002 judgment for pre-judgment interest and therefore, the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis ("St. Louis") was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of pre-judgment interest; and (2) overruling his motion for summary judgment because he was entitled to pre-judgment interest on his judgment against Shelter and Raymond Kallmeyer ("Kallmeyer") in that his pre-judgment interest demand was for $30,000 and the judgment entered against Shelter and Kallmeyer was $32,000. We find no error and affirm.
On December 3, 1999, Kallmeyer, as a permissive user of a vehicle owned by Sally Elder, was involved in automobile accident with Anderson. At the time of the accident Sally Elder had automobile insurance covering the automobile involved in the accident with Shelter. On August 30, 2000, as a result of the accident, Anderson mailed a certified letter to Shelter, containing a demand for settlement in the amount of $30,000.00 pursuant to Section 408.040, RSMo 2000, and on September 1, 2000, he filed a personal injury lawsuit against Kallmeyer in Jefferson County.
Shelter undertook to defend and represent Kallmeyer. Shelter responded to Anderson's August 30, 2000 demand letter with an offer of $15,000.00. On May 6, 2002, a trial was held to adjudicate the lawsuit, and on May 9, 2002, following a jury verdict, judgment was entered in favor of Anderson and against Kallmeyer in the sum of $22,000.00 for compensatory damages and $10,000.00 in punitive damages. On that same day, Anderson filed a motion for pre-judgment interest, which Shelter objected to on behalf of Kallmeyer.
Subsequently, on June 27, 2002, Jefferson County entered an amended judgment adding an award for pre-judgment interest. To satisfy his judgment, on July 9, 2002, Anderson filed a garnishment action against Shelter in St. Louis requesting attorney's fees, costs and both pre- and post-judgment interest. On December 2, 2002, Shelter tendered to Anderson the sum of $23,155.00 in satisfaction of the compensatory damages portion of the judgment, inclusive of post-judgment interest, but not pre-judgment interest.
On January 3, 2003, Anderson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in St. Louis seeking pre-judgment interest in the amount of $4,749.78, alleging that he was entitled to pre-judgment interest as a matter of law because he met the requirements of Section 408.040 and because Shelter was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of pre-judgment interest. In response, Shelter filed its motion for summary judgment alleging that it was not responsible for payment of pre-judgment interest because its policy excluded coverage for punitive damages awards, and because the Jefferson County judgment awarding pre-judgment interest was entered without jurisdiction. On May 23, 2003, St. Louis entered its judgment granting Shelter's summary judgment motion and denying Anderson's. This appeal follows.
When considering an appeal from summary judgment, we review the record essentially de novo and in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. James v. Paul , 49 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo. banc 2001). If no genuine issues of material fact exist and
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