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Raiola v. Chevron U.S.A.2/24/2004
lusive upon this Court if it is supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud. Miss. Code Ann. 71-5-531 (Rev. 2000). The MESC heard testimony from Raiola, Burkes, and Porter. In addition, there are no allegations of fraud. As a result, Raiola is precluded from arguing before this Court that Chevron's termination decision was illegal. See Hood v. Dept. of Wildlife Conservation , 571 So. 2d 263 (Miss. 1990); Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Phila. Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. of Neshoba Co. , 437 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1983).
. The question remains, however, whether all of Raiola's state law claims are precluded. In other words, whether the propriety of Raiola's termination was essential to all of his tort and contract claims. We decline to apply Hood to that extent. Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment because we find Raiola unable to meet all of the necessary elements of his remaining claims.
2. Raiola's State Law Claims
. In order for Raiola to prevail on a claim of defamation, he must prove that the employees made (1) a false and defamatory statement, (2) unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) negligence on the part of the employees in publishing the statement, and (4) there is either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication. Eselin-Bullock & Assoc. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co. , 604 So. 2d 236, 241 (Miss. 1992); Blake v. Gannett Co., Inc. , 529 So. 2d 595, 602 (Miss. 1988).
. Raiola argues he was defamed because three employees labeled him a thief. Raiola alleges that Porter called him a thief during the PRP. The second statement is alleged to have been made by Watson during the MESC hearing. Raiola finally alleges that Burkes called him a thief but there is no evidence in the record of such a statement.
. It should be noted that truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim. Fulton v. Miss. Publisher Corp. , 498 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Miss. 1986). Since it has already been determined that Raiola was guilty of receiving pay for time not worked, Porter and Watson's claim that Raiola was a thief would be protected. Moreover, Porter enjoyed a qualified privilege because any statement made by an employer against an employee when the statement in question affects the employee's employment is protected by a qualified privilege. Young v. Jackson , 572 So. 2d 378, 383 (Miss. 1990). These statements are privileged "absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those persons who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." Id.
. Raiola has presented no evidence that Porter's statements were made with actual malice. Moreover, Raiola admitted in his deposition that Porter never acted in any way that would indicate bad faith or malice toward him. In addition, a company's employees have a legitimate and direct interest regarding the reasons for a co-worker's dismissal. Garziano v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. , 818 F.2d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Benson v. Hall , 339 So. 2d 570, 573 (Miss. 1976)).
. As for Watson's statement, she enjoys an absolute privilege because it was made during the course of the MESC hearing. See Miss. Code Ann. 71-5-131 (Rev. 2000). As a result, we find Raiola's defamation claim to be without merit.
. In order for Raiola to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, he must prove Chevron's conduct to be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Brown v. Inter-City F
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