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Raiola v. Chevron U.S.A.2/24/2004
ed. Bank , 738 So. 2d 262, 264 ( 9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Under our law, liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities. Id. Furthermore, damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress are usually not recoverable in mere employment disputes. Id. "Only in the most unusual cases does the conduct move out of the realm of an ordinary employment dispute into the classification of extreme and outrageous, as required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc. , 16 F.3d 649, 654 (5th Cir.1994).
. Raiola argues that Burkes made inappropriate remarks about his Italian heritage; that he was terminated for reasons he did not think justified Chevron's decision; and that Porter and Watson called him a thief during the PRP meeting and the MESC hearing, respectively. However, we find these acts insufficient to support a claim of this nature. Although Chevron's alleged treatment of Raiola, if true, may have been inappropriate or even upsetting, none of the conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous. Raiola admitted that the remarks about his heritage did not bother him as much as his termination. In addition, Raiola did not complain of any mistreatment until after he was terminated. As a result, we find Raiola's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to be without merit.
. Raiola claims that Chevron is liable for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and negligent hiring and retention. However, Raiola has failed to address these claims in his brief. For the sake of argument, we will briefly analyze Raiola's remaining claims.
. Raiola argues Chevron breached its contract with him despite the fact that he was an employee at will. Coleman v. Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n , 662 So. 2d 626, 628 (Miss. 1995). Raiola presented no evidence of an employment contract. In addition, Chevron's written policy stated that it could terminate employees without cause or notice at any time. Under Mississippi law, contractual liability will not attach where the employer explicitly states that its policies do not form a contract. Hartle v. Packard Elec. , 626 So. 2d 106, 109 (Miss. 1993). This was the case here. As a result, we find Raiola's breach of contract claim to be without merit.
. Raiola argues that Burkes and Porter tortiously interfered with his employment contract. Despite having no employment contract, Mississippi allows for such a cause of action absent such a contract. See Levens v. Campbell , 733 So. 2d 753, 760 ( 27) (Miss. 1999). Nevertheless, Raiola's claim fails for other reasons. This is because Burkes and Porter are privileged to interfere with Chevron's contractual relationship with Raiola if they occupy a position of responsibility with the company when they are working within the scope of that responsibility and absent bad faith. Shaw v. Burchfield , 481 So. 2d 247, 255 (Miss. 1985).
. Porter is the operations manager for Chevron and is responsible for the supervision of its employees. This responsibility entails recommending employees for termination. In addition, Raiola has presented no evidence of bad faith regarding Porter's decision. Likewise, Burkes was a shift supervisor at Chevron. Burkes was responsible for investigating violations of head operators under his supervision. Like Porter, Burkes was acting within his authority when he investigated Raiola's time reports. Moreover, Burkes did not recommend Raiola's termination and any alleged comments by Burkes were found to be unrelated to Raiola's termination. As a result, we find Raiola's tortious interference with contract claim
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