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[T] State v. Smith2/3/2004
ing as prescribed by G.S. § 20-140.
(4) Negligent driving leading to an accident causing:
(a) Property damage in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000); or
(b) Personal injury .
(5) Driving when the person's driver's license is revoked.
(6) Driving in excess of the posted speed limit, during the days and hours when the posted speed limit is in effect, on school property or in an area designated as a school zone pursuant to G.S. § 20-141.1 or in a highway work zone as defined in G.S. § 20-141(j2).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.5(b) (2003). Defendant, while driving with a revoked license, led police on a high-speed chase, during which defendant disregarded traffic signals and signs, traveled in excess of one hundred (100) miles per hour, sped through school zones while children were being dismissed from school, and drove down the center of the road causing vehicles to veer off the road and pedestrians to flee. The pursuit continued until defendant wrecked the stolen vehicle into a mobile home, causing several thousand dollars worth of damage. The State produced sufficient evidence of more than two statutory factors. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss this charge.
Defendant argues the trial court should have dismissed the charge of resisting a public officer. Two officers testified that defendant ran from police and once detained, he was "somewhat combative" and "resisting." The State produced sufficient evidence to show that defendant willfully resisted the named officer duringthe performance of his duties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2003). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss this charge.
The State produced sufficient evidence tending to show the elements of each offense and that defendant committed the offenses charged. This assignment of error is overruled.
V. Closing Argument
Defendant argues the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu to stop the prosecutor from referring, in his closing, to the "uncontradicted evidence." The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 23 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit a prosecutor in a criminal trial from referring to a defendant's decision not to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 14 L.Ed. 2d 106, 110 (1965); State v. Reid, 334 N.C. 551, 555, 434 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993). Our Supreme Court has held that the prosecutor may comment on a defendant's failure to produce witnesses or exculpatory evidence to contradict or refute evidence presented by the State. Reid, 334 N.C. at 555, 434 S.E.2d at 196.
Here, the prosecutor made no reference to defendant's failure to testify but described and summarized the evidence as "uncontradicted." We cannot conclude, and defendant has failed to show, that this language prejudiced defendant's case. Defendant failed to refute the evidence presented by the State and the trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to argue this fact before the jury. This assignment of error is overruled.
VI. Conclusion
The trial court properly admitted the DMV record into evidence after the State made a proper showing that it was a certified copy of a public record. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss and did not err by allowing the prosecutor to refer to the "uncontradicted evidence" during closing argument. Defendant's assignments of error are overruled.
No Error.
Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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