 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Cherry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.2/3/2004
rve the ends of justice." Atlantic Tobacco Co. v. Honeycutt, 101 N.C. App. 160, 164, 398 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1990). The doctrine of disregarding a corporation's separate and independent existence is commonly referred to as piercing the corporate veil, and we do not invoke it lightly. Department of Transp. v. Airlie Park, Inc., 156 N.C. App. 63, 68, 576 S.E.2d 341, 344, appeal dismissed by, 357 N.C. 504, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2003). Accord Keener Lumber Co. v. Perry, 149 N.C. App. 19, 37, 560 S.E.2d 817, 829, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 164, 568 S.E.2d 196 (2002) (quoting Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 672, 336 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1985)) (noting that piercing the corporate veil is "`a drastic remedy' and `should be invoked only in an extreme case where necessary to serve the ends of justice'"). "Piercing the corporate veil of a corporation allows a plaintiff to impose legal liability for a corporation's obligations, or for torts committed by the corporation, upon some other company or individual that controls and dominates the corporation." Id.
Plaintiffs have not asserted Jump has dominated or controlled B&L;for the purpose of imposing the legal liability of B&L;s obligations on Jump and thereby reach Jump's individual assets. Rather, plaintiffs ask this Court to disregard B&L;s separate corporate identity under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil for the purpose of reaching State Farm's coverage. Granting plaintiffs' request would be tantamount to rewriting the terms of the subject policy by requiring State Farm, B&L;s liability insurance provider, to cover someone other than the named insured. Plaintiffs have cited no authority supporting the application of piercing the corporate veil in this manner, and we decline to adopt it.
In summary, the insurance policy by State Farm covered solely owned and temporary substitute vehicles of B&L; the insured. Jump was neither an insured, nor was the truck he was driving a covered vehicle. We reject plaintiffs' propounded application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs against State Farm. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for State Farm.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Judges McGEE and HUDSON concur.
|