Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia2/6/2004
l question for the trial court to address on remand. Cf. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 77, 92 L.Ed. 476, 492 (1948) (remand to trial court appropriate where lower courts have adjudicated parties' rights "without considering essential facts in light of the controlling law"); Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. 321, 327-28, 69 L.Ed. 309, 312-13 (1924) (remand to trial court appropriate where trial court did not decide questions of fact upon which ultimate decision must rest); Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. Simon, 246 U.S. 46, 57, 62 L.Ed. 568, 573-74 (1918) (delay in ultimate disposition of case resulting from remand preferable to Court's exercising "a duty which it was the province of the court below to perform"). This disposition reflects trial courts' "institutional advantages" over appellate courts in the "application of facts to fact-dependent legal standards." Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 586, 573 S.E.2d 125, 129 (2002).
Moreover, we are unable to determine from the record what precise formulation of judicial estoppel the trial court applied to the facts of the instant case. Assuming that the trial court applied the law of judicial estoppel as it had been articulated by our appellate courts up to now, see Medicare Rentals, 119 N.C. App. at 769-71, 460 S.E.2d at 363-64, State v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. at 400, 496 S.E.2d at 815, the court necessarily applied a version of the doctrine substantially different from the one we delineate today. Because the trial judge "did not have the legal standard which we articulate today to guide him in his consideration of the case, . . . it is not reasonable to expect him to have applied it without the benefit of this opinion." State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165, 90 L.Ed. 2d 732 (1986), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 103 L.Ed. 2d 230 (1989). Accordingly, we remand to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for reconsideration of defendants' motion for summary judgment in light of our newly articulated standards concerning judicial estoppel and the applicability of the privity concept. See id. at 75, 310 S.E.2d at 309.
We note that a trial court's application of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 149 L.Ed. 2d at 977-78 (" udicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion."); see also Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Food World, 133 F.3d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998); McNemar v. Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1145, 136 L.Ed. 2d 845 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 143 L.Ed. 2d 966 (1999); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. at 400, 496 S.E.2d at 815-16. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals properly recognized, " hen an action pled is barred by a legal impediment, such as judicial estoppel, there are no triable issues of fact as a matter of law." Whitacre P'ship, 153 N.C. App. at 614, 574 S.E.2d at 479 (citing Andrews v. Davenport, 84 N.C. App. 675, 677, 353 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1987), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 671, 356 S.E.2d 774 (1987)). Thus, when a trial court has acted within its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, leaving no triable issues of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate. See Montrose, 243 F.3d at 779 ("Summary judgment is appropriate when operation of judicial estoppel renders a litigant unable to state a prima facie case."); West Delta Oil Co. v. Hof, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15776, at *7 (E.D. La. 2002) (application of judicial estoppel in context of summary judgment motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U
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