 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Caviglia v. Royal Tours of America2/19/2004
lid on equal protection grounds when it does not apply "evenhandedly" to similarly situated people. Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 562. Analyses under equal protection and due process "proceed along parallel lines," and "overlap" to some degree. Id. at 569.
A state statute generally does not run afoul of federal substantive due process protections if the statute "reasonably relates to a legitimate legislative purpose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 563 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S. Ct. 505, 516, 78 L. Ed. 940, 957 (1934)). If the statute is founded on some conceivable rational basis to promote a public purpose, it will survive constitutional scrutiny. Ibid. A more exacting standard applies to a statute that infringes on a fundamental right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 178 (1973) (requiring compelling state interest); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1936, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 537 (1977).
When evaluating substantive due process and equal protection challenges under the New Jersey Constitution, this Court applies a balancing test. Sojourner, supra, 177 N.J. at 332; Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567; Barone v. Dep't of Human Serv., Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Serv., 107 N.J. 355, 368 (1987). That test weighs the "nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction." Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567; see also Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 368. We require that the means selected by the Legislature "bear a real and substantial relationship to a permissible legislative purpose." Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 44 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S. Ct. 1672, 52 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1977) (citing Nebbia, supra, 291 U.S. at 525, 54 S. Ct. at 505, 78 L. Ed. at 950); see also Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 123 (1955).
In finding that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a violated federal and state constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, the Appellate Division held that the absolute bar to recovery of non-economic damages was arbitrary and irrational. At the heart of the Appellate Division's analysis was its conclusion that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a abrogated plaintiff's common law right to pursue a cause of action for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Caviglia, supra, 355 N.J. Super. at 4-5,
8. We see the issue differently.
Section 4.5a did nothing more than subject the right to sue for non-economic damages in an automobile accident case to the condition that the injured motorist secure liability insurance. Preconditions on the filing of lawsuits are a common feature of our laws. A few examples will illustrate the point. The Legislature requires an injured plaintiff to comply with the statute of limitations as a condition to filing a lawsuit. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff must serve notice of an intention to sue a public entity or public employee within ninety days of the accrual date of the cause of action. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. The failure to do so may result in dismissal of the lawsuit. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8a. In professional malpractice cases, a plaintiff must serve on a defendant an affidavit of merit no later that 120 days after the filing of an answer; otherwise the complaint is subject to dismissal with prejudice. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29; Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assoc., 178 N.J. 144, 146 (2003). Although those are examples of procedural preconditions to the filing of a lawsuit and, therefore, are of a different kind than the condition that a driver be insured to pursue an actio
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 New Jersey Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|