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Caviglia v. Royal Tours of America2/19/2004
n for personal injuries, the point remains that the Legislature has the authority to place restrictions on the right to sue.
There are a number of restrictions on the right to sue for personal injuries in automobile accident cases. An injured motorist subject to the verbal threshold must satisfy that threshold and serve on a defendant a physician's certification attesting to the nature of his injuries. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. A motorist may not pursue a personal injury action if he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5b.
That bar also extends to any driver who suffered injuries while attempting to cause harm with his automobile at the time of the accident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5c.
One public policy rationale behind N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 is to deter drunk driving , the intentional use of automobiles as weapons, and drivers from operating uninsured vehicles. In furtherance of that deterrence rationale, the uninsured driver forfeits the right to sue by failing to comply with a necessary precondition to filing suit: maintaining insurance coverage. A motorist does not have a fundamental right to operate an automobile without liability insurance.
The Appellate Division agreed with plaintiff that an absolute bar to recovery of non-economic damages "runs contrary" to the original and primary impetus for New Jersey's No-Fault legislation: providing speedy recovery for plaintiff's losses resulting from automobile accidents. The Legislature, however, in fashioning methods to promote the financial security of the no-fault system was not limited to its early objectives. As the No Fault Act has evolved, the goals of increased insurance availability and cost-containment have become at least as important as the goal of reparation. See Oswin, supra, 129 N.J. at 296 (noting that Legislature's focus in passing Cost Containment Act and subsequent creation of tort options was concern over controlling rising cost of insurance); Parkway Ins. Co., supra, 330 N.J. Super. at 180 (noting that Cost Containment Act was reaction to original No Fault Act's failure to achieve lower insurance rates). That the experience of our No-Fault scheme in New Jersey has led the Legislature to redirect its objectives does not render acts in furtherance of current goals constitutionally infirm.
The Legislature is empowered to pass enactments that create incentives to coerce compliance with the law. See, e.g., State v. Graney, 174 N.J. Super. 455, 457, 459 (App. Div. 1980) (stating that Legislature may punish those who drive with suspended or revoked licenses, even though faultless in causing accident, as means of deterrence). Our laws give uninsured drivers compelling reasons for obtaining automobile liability coverage. A person driving an uninsured vehicle is subject to a mandatory fine and a one-year license suspension. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. A second-time offender is subject to a jail term. Ibid. A person driving an uninsured vehicle is stripped of his rights to sue for economic damages. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a.
Plaintiff has not suggested that the Legislature acted beyond its constitutional authority with those enactments; he only claims that the Legislature overstepped its bounds by denying the faultless and injured, uninsured driver the right to sue for non-economic damages. It would be odd indeed for a plaintiff to possess a constitutional right to sue for non-economic damages, but no such similar right to sue for economic damages. We see no justifiable distinction between the two categories of damages. The Legislature may place reasonable conditions on the right to seek recovery for both forms of damages.
The Appellate Division surmised that depriving an unins
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