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Caviglia v. Royal Tours of America2/19/2004
ng the legislation to show that it lacks a rational basis. Board of Educ. of Piscataway Tp. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025, 102 S. Ct. 560, 70 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1981). We customarily grant great deference to the Legislature in its decisions governing the necessity and reasonableness of economic and social legislation. Edgewater Inv. Assocs. v. Borough of Edgewater, 103 N.J. 227, 235 (1986). In this case, the Appellate Division shifted the burden to the State to justify the constitutionality of the statute. The State, however, was not obligated to present statistical evidence to prove the soundness of the legislation. In the absence of a "sufficient showing" that the Legislature lacked factual support for its judgment, this Court will assume that the statute is based on "some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the Legislature." Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 95 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812, 89 S. Ct. 1486 (Mem), 22 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1969) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, the arithmetic of this State's automobile liability insurance scheme is not difficult to compute. When fewer motorists purchase automobile insurance and more uninsured motorists receive payment on their claims for personal injuries, those who obey our compulsory insurance laws pay higher premiums. The Legislature may do more than ponder powerlessly such an inequitable equation. The Legislature may act to give motorists incentives to purchase insurance so that a greater pool of insurance proceeds will be available for all accident victims. Alternatively, it may bar the claims of those who fail to contribute to the system by obtaining insurance. We cannot say that this is an irrational approach towards stabilizing or decreasing insurance costs for those who comply with our insurance laws.
We need not address whether the abrogation of an entire cause of action would violate plaintiff's substantive due process rights because here we find that the Legislature did not do so. Rather, it placed a reasonable condition on the exercise of the right to sue for personal injuries in an automobile accident case. Placing such a condition bears a "real and substantial relationship" to the Legislature's no-fault goals. We uphold N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a on due process grounds because the statute does not implicate a fundamental right and it is rationally related to, and suitably furthers, a legitimate state interest.
IV.
We also find that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a does not violate the equal protection rights of uninsured drivers under the Federal or State Constitutions. Under the Federal Constitution, if a statute does not burden a "fundamental right" or differentiate between a "suspect" or "semi-suspect" class, it is evaluated under the less stringent rational basis review. Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 364-65; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-66; 101 S. Ct. 715, 722-25, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 667-70 (1981). As we previously stated, under our State Constitution, we apply a flexible balancing test that weighs the nature of the right, the extent of the governmental restriction on the right, and whether the restriction is in the public interest. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 308-09 (1982).
Applying those standards, we find no classification in violation of equal protection. Clearly, uninsured drivers do not belong to a class entitled to heightened protections under our Federal or State Constitutions. See Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 365 (concluding that poverty is not a suspect classification); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 299, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2679, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980) (same conclusion under Federal Constitution). Uninsured drivers
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