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Caviglia v. Royal Tours of America2/19/2004
are not similarly situated to insured drivers because uninsured drivers are in violation of the law, and their counterparts are not. Uninsured drivers, therefore, cannot expect to receive the same treatment.
Moreover, section 4.5a, as noted, serves the public welfare by promoting compliance with our compulsory insurance laws. The more drivers who purchase insurance, the more resources available to provide medical benefits to persons injured in accidents. Balancing the government's strong interest in enforcing its laws and the reasonable restriction placed on drivers who wish to pursue a personal injury action, we conclude that subjecting uninsured drivers to disparate legislative treatment is justified by the public need in having all drivers conform with the No Fault Act.
The Appellate Division found that section 4.5a violated equal protection because it barred uninsured drivers from recovering non-economic damages, while permitting the same drivers to recover property damages. The appellate panel followed Mody v. Brooks, 339 N.J. Super. 392, 400-01 (App. Div. 2001), and construed section 4.5a as not precluding an uninsured's cause of action for property damage. The court then submitted that a statute that prohibits a lawsuit for non-economic damages but not property damage is irrational. The Attorney General argues that economic damage includes property damage and is, therefore, barred by section 4.5a. That issue, however, is unresolved and has not been briefed or argued before this Court.
Assuming, however, that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a did not bar an uninsured driver's suit for property damage, precluding recovery for other economic and non-economic damages would still be a legitimate exercise of legislative power. The Legislature may have decided that the most powerful means to coerce an uninsured driver into complying with the law was to deny recovery for personal injuries. "If a statutory distinction has some reasonable basis, 'a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.'" Whitaker v. Devilla, 147 N.J. 341, 358 (1997) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 501 (1970)). Moreover, even if it was legislative oversight to allow an uninsured driver a recovery for property damage, the other means selected to advance the legislative goals are not necessarily invalid. Many statutes over time are improved by amendments that clarify legislative intent or plug statutory gaps that create inconsistencies. The test is not whether the statute is a perfect creation, but whether it is rational and furthers a legitimate state interest.
Having determined that the State may place reasonable conditions on the filing of a lawsuit and distinguish between insured and uninsured drivers, we find that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5a does not violate federal or state equal protection guarantees. Section 4.5a is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and there is a "'real and substantial relationship between the classification and the government purpose which it purportedly serves.'" Whitaker, supra, 147 N.J. at 357 (quoting Barone, supra, 107 N.J. at 368).
V.
We find that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5b does not violate the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Federal and State Constitutions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and WALLACE join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion.
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