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State v. Druktenis1/30/2004
"arguably has its roots in the Constitution." Rotunda & Nowak, supra, (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605).
2. Reputation Interest
The combination of the registration and notification provisions in SORNA have a strong potential of resulting in damage to reputation. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (holding an employee's liberty interest would be implicated if dismissal were based on charges that "imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities"); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971) (stating that it would be naive not to recognize that the public posting of a notice that characterizes an individual in a certain negative manner would "expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule," and holding a protectible liberty interest implicated " here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him"); Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the inclusion of a person on a list branded her as a child abuser, thereby "call into question her good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419 (holding that public notification with respect to certain sex offender classifications "would expose plaintiff to public opprobrium, not only identifying him as a sex offender but also labeling him as potentially currently dangerous, and thereby undermining his reputation and standing in the community").
The general parameters of due process deprivation in the context of a reputation interest were established by the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Paul Court stated generally that:
here exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either "liberty" or "property" as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status.
Id. at 710-11 (footnote omitted). However, the Court in Paul made it clear that although it can be reasonably argued that one's interest in reputation is a protected interest under state tort law, the alteration of reputation status by defamation does not result in a deprivation of any "liberty" interest--that is, "the interest in reputation . . . is neither `liberty' nor `property' guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law." Id. at 712; see Hourigan v. Cassidy, 2001-NMCA-085, 14, 131 N.M. 141, 33 P.3d 891 (" enerally there is no constitutional claim for . . . loss of reputation.") (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 712).
In further elaboration, the Court in Paul indicated that more than injury to reputation interest is required to invoke procedural due process guarantees. More particularly, the State must have recognized a right or status beyond that of reputation alone, and such right or status, together with injury to reputation, must have been "distinctly altered or extinguished," or "officially remov . . . from the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State." Id. at 711. Courts have called this Paul requirement of an impairment of an interest recognized by states, in addition to mere damage to reputation, "stigma plus." See Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 999.
In Hourigan, this Court recognized the concept of stigma p
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