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Wileyv. Good Samaritan Hospital2/20/2004
nstitute a final appealable order if it contains the words "there is no just reason for delay" under Civ.R. 54(B), and if it otherwise qualifies as final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02.
. In this case, the trial court included Civ.R. 54(B) language in the entry. Thus, the order became final on February 18, 2000. Pursuant to App.R. 4, Wiley had thirty days from the entry of the order or the service of notice of the judgment to perfect an appeal. Wiley did not file an appeal until February 21, 2003, more than three years after the trial court's determination on this issue. Nevertheless, Wiley contends that he did not file an immediate appeal because the order was not final given that the issue of whether Nayebi was an agent of Good Samaritan Hospital was still pending.
. While we note that it appears that the trial court did address the agency issue in its summary-judgment order, Wiley should have filed a timely appeal to this court contesting the finality of summary judgment so that we could have been given the opportunity to determine whether the order was in fact final with respect to Good Samaritan Hospital. Asserting such an argument now is simply untimely. Because the February 18, 2000, summary-judgment order contained Civ.R. 54(B) language making it appealable, we hold that Wiley's present appeal of the summary-judgment order is time-barred. Because we have no jurisdiction to consider Wiley's second and third assignments of error, we sua sponte dismiss them.
. Nayebi and Good Samaritan Hospital have filed independent cross-appeals. In Nayebi's cross-appeal, he brings forth three assignments of error relating to evidence admitted by Wiley against Nayebi, particularly expert evidence, evidence of a prior lawsuit initiated by Wiley, and evidence of a subsequent injury to Wiley's left leg. The fourth assignment of error brought by Nayebi relates to preemptory challenges. Given our disposition of Wiley's first assignment of error, in which we have upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of Nayebi on the issues of battery and fraud, and given that Wiley does not contest the trial court's finding in favor of Nayebi on the negligence issue, we conclude that the assignments of error in Nayebi's cross-appeal are moot. In Good Samaritan Hospital's cross-assignment, it contends that the trial court erred in allowing Wiley to have three peremptory challenges. Given our disposition of Wiley's first, second, and third assignments of error, we conclude that Good Samaritan Hospital's cross-appeal is also moot.
. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of Nayebi and Good Samaritan Hospital, and we dismiss Nayebi and Good Samaritan Hospital's cross-appeals as moot. Judgment affirmed.
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