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State v. Thomas2/27/2004
that they do to the inmates, and they found a six-and-a-half-inch shank on him.
A: I don't work here, so I don't know.
Q: You didn't know anything about that?
A: No one ever notified me about that[.]
Mrs. Barber testified that knowledge of this incident would not change her opinion as to her son. Defendant Thomas complains that this line of questioning was error because it was more prejudicial than probative.
Our criminal code provides that the rules of evidence do not limit the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. See Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 39-13-204(c). See also Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 702. The supreme court has interpreted section 39-13-204(c) as permitting trial judges wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence in ruling on the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. See State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn.), cert. den. 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357 (2001). As the Sims court stated,
The Rules of Evidence should not be applied to preclude introduction of otherwise reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the nature and circumstances of the particular crime, or the character and background of the individual defendant. As our case history reveals, however, the discretion allowed judges and attorneys during sentencing in first degree murder cases is not unfettered. Our constitutional standards require inquiry into the reliability, relevance, value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the defendant and the victim's family. The rules of evidence can in some instances be helpful guides in reaching these determinations of admissibility. Trial judges are not, however, required to adhere strictly to the rules of evidence. These rules are too restrictive and unwieldy in the arena of capital sentencing.
45 S.W.3d at 14. The questioning was relevant to rebut testimony about Defendant Thomas' positive character traits, including allegations by Mrs. Barber that Defendant Thomas attempted to improve himself while incarcerated. Thus, Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this claim.
XIV. Failure to Act as 13th Juror
Defendant Thomas also argues that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and the trial court, acting as thirteenth juror, should have overturned the verdicts. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(f) provides that " he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence." Our supreme court has explained that "Rule 33(f) imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case . . . ." State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995).
When the trial judge simply overrules a motion for new trial, this Court may presume that the trial judge has served as the thirteenth juror and approved the jury's verdict. See id.
In the instant case, the trial court simply overruled the Defendant's motion for new trial without making any comments regarding a dissatisfaction with the weight of the evidence. Thus, this Court presumes that the trial court acted as thirteenth juror and approved the verdicts of the jury. Because the record contains no statements by the trial court expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with the weight of the evidence or the jury's verdict, or indicating that the trial court misunderstood its role as thirteenth juror, this Court will not gr
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