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[T] Amrhein v. Acuity2/18/2004
nally certain" that Schaal would sustain injuries as a result of his actions. See Pachucki, 89 Wis. 2d at 710 ("the actor must intend the consequences of his acts, or believe that they are substantially certain to follow").
. While the question of intent to harm is ordinarily an issue of fact for a jury, we have recognized circumstances that permit courts to infer such intent. Bruner, 225 Wis. 2d at 739. Intent to harm may be inferred if "the conduct alleged is of such a nature that injury or harm is substantially certain to result." Id. We may also infer intent "where a reasonable [person] in the defendant's position would believe that a particular result was substantially certain to follow." Id. (quoting K.A.G. v. Stanford, 148 Wis. 2d 158, 162-63, 434 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1988) (intent to harm was inferred from allegations of sexual assault of a child)). Furthermore, a person is "presumed to intend `the natural and probable consequences of his [or her] acts voluntarily and knowingly performed.'" Id. (citation omitted).
. Schaal argues that the facts of this case are akin to those of Gouger v. Hardtke, 167 Wis. 2d 504, 482 N.W.2d 84 (1992). There the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant based on its determination that defendant's actions were intentional as a matter of law and therefore the plaintiff's action for intentional tort exceeded the statute of limitations. Id. at 509-10. However, the supreme court reversed. Id. at 520.
. The injury in Gouger occurred when two high school friends engaged in "hassling and teasing one another in a welding shop class." Id. at 508. At one point, Gouger threw a piece of soapstone at Hardtke and struck him in the head. Id. Hardtke then turned and saw Gouger laughing. Hardtke then picked up the piece of soapstone and threw it back at Gouger. The soapstone struck Gouger in the eye, damaging his cornea. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment based on its finding that Hardtke's conduct in throwing the soapstone was substantially certain to result in some injury and that it could infer intent as a matter of law. Id. at 509-10.
. In reversing the trial court's ruling that the conduct was intentional as a matter of law, the supreme court stated:
The facts in this case do not warrant inferring as a matter of law that Hardtke intended to injure Gouger. The conduct of throwing a piece of soapstone at another person, even with the intent of hitting that person, is not so substantially certain to cause injury that a court may infer an intent to injure. Indeed, in light of the fact that Hardtke and Gouger were friends, it is equally or perhaps more reasonable to infer that Hardtke did not intend to injure Gouger.
....
In this case, the "horseplay" nature of the conduct in question, the fact that Gouger and Hardtke were friends at the time, and Hardtke's inconsistent pleading stating that he did not act intentionally cast sufficient doubt on Hardtke's credibility to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. at 514-15, 517-18.
. We reject Schaal's reliance on Gouger. Schaal's injury did not result from horseplay between two friends, making it reasonable to assume that the injury was unintended. Instead, the injury was the result of an intentional battery by Hoeft against Schaal-a battery solicited by Raymond. Further, in Gouger, the plaintiff had filed an affidavit at summary judgment stating his belief that Hardtke did not intend to injure him or throw the soapstone at him and Hardtke himself had initially filed a response indicating that he had intended to hit Gouger but then responded that he had not intended to hurt Gouger. Id. at 509. In t
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