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[T] Amrhein v. Acuity2/18/2004
haal also alleged that Raymond was negligent in failing to supervise Hoeft. Schaal presents this as an independent basis for coverage, separate from Raymond's solicitation of Hoeft to commit the battery. We reject Schaal's attempt to "slice and dice" Raymond's conduct into these miniscule component parts. Instead, we agree with the trial court's statement that " verything that's been described here would ... indicate that the conduct of Mr. Caminata can't be described as anything other than intentional conduct on his part." (Emphasis added.) The trial court made this statement at the outset of its ruling and was speaking not just to Raymond's solicitation of Hoeft to commit the battery, but to the entire gamut of Raymond's conduct, even to the point of branding the conduct criminal under the law of party to a crime. The court closed its ruling with the same observation: " gain, the conduct as described and as raised in the complaint ... constitutes intentional conduct on the part of Mr. Caminata and can't be viewed as being negligent or accidental or otherwise creating an occurrence."
. Therefore, assuming that Raymond failed to supervise Hoeft after the solicitation, we hold that the only reasonable inference is that this was a continuation of Raymond's intentional scheme to accomplish Hoeft's assault of Schaal.
. We next turn to Schaal's challenge to the trial court's determination that the Acuity policy also does not provide coverage for Schaal's claim under Wis. Stat. ยง 895.035(2), which renders parents liable "for personal injury attributable to a willful, malicious or wanton act of [their minor] child." Here again the trial court determined that the assault on Schaal was intentional and therefore could not be considered an "occurrence" under Acuity's policy.
. Acuity's policy provides coverage for personal liability if a claim is made or a suit is brought "against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence" to which coverage applies. Acuity's policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident including exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in: a. Bodily injury; or b. Property damage." (Emphasis added.)
. Schaal contends that there is a material issue of fact as to whether Julie's intentional acts constitute an "undesirable event" for which Raymond could reasonably expect coverage. In support, he cites to Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 289, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998), in which the court adopted a common definition of "accident" which included "` n unexpected, undesirable event' or `an unforeseen incident' which is characterized by a `lack of intention.'" (Citing The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 11 (3rd ed. 1992).)
. While we agree with Schaal that Julie's intentional actions brought about an "undesirable event," the definition of "accident" in Doyle requires that the undesirable event be unexpected or unforeseen and characterized by a "lack of intention." Here, the bodily injury to Schaal was not an accident. It was both intended and foreseeable. Julie acted in concert with Hoeft in planning and carrying out the attack on Schaal, including determining how Hoeft would strike the first blow and informing him when to do so. Just as Raymond intentionally solicited the attack, Julie intentionally aided and abetted it. A reasonable person in Raymond's position would not expect coverage for the intentional acts of his minor child, which contributed to an undesirable event which was expected, foreseen and sought by the insured.
CONCLUSION
. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Schaal, we conclude that there is no material iss
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