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State v. Prasertphong9/2/2003
3 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 (June 30, 2003). Unless the trial court abuses its discretion, there is no reversible error. State v. Melendez, 121 Ariz. 1, 3, 588 P.2d 294, 296 (1978) (citing State v. Smith, 114 Ariz. 415, 418, 561 P.2d 739, 742 (1977)); State v. (Jessie) Lopez, 134 Ariz. 469, 471, 657 P.2d 882, 884 (App. 1982).
At trial, Prasertphong objected to the question, arguing that information regarding his citizenship was irrelevant and extremely prejudicial. On appeal, he contends that the only possible relevance to the information "would be to let the jury know it did not have to accord him all the rights associated with citizenship as he was not in fact a citizen." Prasertphong cites no cases to support this assertion and presents no evidence that the jury considered Prasertphong's citizenship status in rendering its verdict.
"The purpose of voir dire examination is to determine whether prospective jurors can fairly and impartially decide the case at bar." State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 409, 610 P.2d 38, 43 (1980). The trial court must ask prospective jurors questions "it deems necessary to determine their qualifications," State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz 93, 99, 664 P.2d 637, 643 (1983), and that will "unveil a juror's prejudices." State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 576, 627 P.2d 721, 727 (App. 1981). Under the circumstances of this case, inquiry into whether Prasertphong's nationality would affect a potential juror's ability to be fair was logical. For example, during Prasertphong's statement to the police, he told them that he had been born in Thailand but could speak English fluently "except for the big words." Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in asking the potential jurors whether Prasertphong's race and citizenship status would affect their ability to be fair and impartial.
VII.
Prasertphong next claims that he was "denied equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when he was convicted by a jury whose selection was tainted by the state's exercise of its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner." He argues that the trial court's error entitles him to a new trial.
The State peremptorily struck the only prospective juror of Asian descent. Prasertphong challenged the strike based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a prosecutor from striking jurors based on race. The State explained that it struck the juror because "she clearly did not want to sit on this jury" and the prosecutor "didn't want somebody sitting here three weeks that didn't want to be here." The trial court found this explanation to be nondiscriminatory and denied Prasertphong's Batson challenge.
Denial of a Batson challenge will not be reversed unless it was clearly erroneous. State v. Harris, 184 Ariz. 617, 618, 911 P.2d 623, 624 (App. 1995). "We review de novo the trial court's application of the law." State v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 368, 18 P.3d 160, 162 (App. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1014 (2001).
Batson sets forth a three step process to determine if a juror has been discriminatorily struck. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the strike was made on the basis of race. Second, the burden then switches to the prosecutor, who must give a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Third, if the prosecutor offers a facially neutral basis for the strike, the trial court must determine if the reason given is pretextual and actually based on race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98; State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 12, 951 P.2d 869, 877 (19
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