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State v. Prasertphong9/2/2003
rch. Id. at 497.
The trial court denied Prasertphong's motion to suppress based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984). Under that doctrine, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means. Id. at 444. Lawful means includes discovery "by following routine procedures." United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989).
Prasertphong challenges the trial court's conclusion that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. He argues that the State's mere assertion that "on-going police procedures certainly would have eventuated in the gun being found" does not make it so. The State argues, as it did at trial, that even if the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable, the evidence was admissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. We agree. We can affirm a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if the court reached the correct result even though based on incorrect reasoning. State v. Sardo, 112 Ariz. 509, 515, 543 P.2d 1138, 1144 (1975) (citing State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 146, 426 P.2d 639, 643 (1967)).
Under the automobile exception, " f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985)). If the automobile exception applies, there is no requirement of a separate exigency. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999).
The reasons for the automobile exception are twofold: mobility and reduced expectations of privacy. "Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern [an automobile search] because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)). "These reduced expectations... 'justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.'" State v. Garrett, 584 N.W.2d 502, 507 (N.D. 1998) (quoting Carney, 471 U.S. at 392).
Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person could believe that "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); State v. Burris, 131 Ariz. 563, 568, 643 P.2d 8, 13 (App. 1982). For purposes of the automobile exception, probable cause to conduct "a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized." Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (same). As long as probable cause exists, the search need not occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985) (citing Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52). Thus, even if an automobile has been impounded or is not otherwise "immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justifie application of the vehicular exception" so long as there was probable cause. Carney, 471 U.S. at 391; see also Johns, 469 U.S. at 484-88 (holding vehicle lawfully seized and in police custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, without the need to show exigent circumstances); U
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