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State v. Prasertphong9/2/2003
nited States v. Matthews, 32 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding district court erred when it held that the automobile exception did not apply because the vehicle had been searched after impoundment at the police station); Garrett, 584 N.W.2d at 508 (finding permissible a vehicle search conducted after vehicle was moved to the police station because "the police [were] only doing later what they could have done earlier" and "a subsequent search of a vehicle at the station is no greater intrusion on one's privacy interests than a search of the vehicle when it was initially seized").
Here, Prasertphong does not contest the seizure of his vehicle. Thus, if probable cause existed that the vehicle contained contraband when Prasertphong was arrested, then the subsequent searches of his vehicle were lawful.
Before the first search of Prasertphong's truck, the police had information that Prasertphong was involved in the murders, that the murder weapon was a gun, that Prasertphong owned a gun, and that a truck resembling Prasertphong's was seen leaving the area near the Pizza Hut shortly before police arrived. These facts alone gave Detective Wright probable cause to search the vehicle. After the first search proved unsuccessful, Detective Wright received additional information that Prasertphong admitted placing the gun in the wheel well of the spare tire of the truck. As a result, Detective Wright had probable cause to believe that the weapon would be located in the wheel well of the spare tire. Because Prasertphong's vehicle was properly seized and Detective Wright had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Prasertphong's motion to suppress the evidence.
III.
Prasertphong next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the introduction of portions of Huerstel's statement to police inculpating Prasertphong.
At trial, Prasertphong, citing Rule 804(b)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, asked to introduce portions of Huerstel's statement to the police that were self-incriminating. The State agreed that the self-incriminating portions of Huerstel's statement were admissible, but maintained that under Rule 106, Arizona Rules of Evidence, the entire statement, including portions that shifted some responsibility for the crimes to Prasertphong, should be admitted, to avoid misleading the jury. Prasertphong argued that admission of the entire statement would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The trial judge stated that "because of the nature of the statements and the totality of the circumstances,... [Huerstel's statements] bear an adequate indicia of reliability." Therefore, "notwithstanding the defendant's confrontation clause argument," if Prasertphong introduced part of Huerstel's statement, the court ruled that the State could introduce the balance of the statement under Rule 106.
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under exceptions to the rule against hearsay for abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, 41, 68 P.3d 110, 118 (2003). Review of a trial court's determination of a Confrontation Clause violation is de novo. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion).
Arizona Rule of Evidence 106 provides as follows:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
Under
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