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In re Clower9/18/2003
t funds to unknown parties were properly issued, the documents maintained by Respondent would not have been sufficient to establish that Respondent was in compliance with his fiduciary duties. Absent proof that the checks issued to Ms. Bradford's acquaintances were properly issued, the Clients' Security Trust Fund might have been required to compensate Ms. Bradford's heirs. See D.C. Bar R. XII, § 3, "Purpose of Trust Fund."
We agree fully with the Board's reasoning and its conclusion that respondent violated his duty to maintain "complete records" of the account in which he held his client's settlementproceeds. Respondent argues that the Board adopted a novel interpretation of a vague requirement - the Rules do not define the term "complete records" - and that it is unfair to hold him accountable under a more rigorous record keeping standard than was in place at the time he disbursed Ms. Bradford's funds. Respondent emphasizes that he did maintain records that showed each disbursement he made and that identified each payee. Cf. In re Choroszej, 624 A.2d 434, 436 (D.C. 1992) (holding that attorney failed to maintain complete records in violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-103 (B)(3), the predecessor to Rule 1.15 (a), where he could not produce a ledger of the checks he had written on a client trust account or bank statements and accounting records showing what was paid to or received from his clients).
We reject respondent's argument. The Board's interpretation of the "complete records" requirement strikes us as only common sense, and it is not novel. See In re Jones, 521 A.2d 1119, 1121 (D.C. 1986) (adopting Board report finding a violation of DR 9-103 (B)(3) where attorney could not furnish documentary justification for disputed disbursements); see also the Model Rule on Financial Recordkeeping adopted by the American Bar Association in 1993, which lists in detail the records a lawyer should keep. Moreover, the gaps in respondent's records were blatant: his settlement and disbursement statement purported to list the persons entitled to shares of the settlement proceeds, but he made payments to persons who were not listed and failed to pay one person who was listed. Nothing in respondent's records explained these obvious discrepancies.
The Board recommends a public censure as the appropriate sanction for respondent's failures to notify and pay Mr. Randolph promptly and to maintain complete records of client funds. Respondent argues that a public censure is too harsh and is inconsistent with sanctions imposed in similar cases; he asks us to consider an informal admonition instead. Our Rules provide that we "shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise beunwarranted." D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (g)(1). "Although the ultimate choice of a sanction rests with this court, we are obliged to respect the Board's sense of equity in these matters unless that exercise of judgment proves to be unreasonable." In re Ross, 658 A.2d 209, 210 (D.C. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Based on the gravity of respondent's prolonged failure to notify or pay Mr. Randolph (which was exacerbated by respondent's failure to pay even after the omission was brought to respondent's attention), respondent's disbursement to others of the funds in which Mr. Randolph had an interest, the sizable amount at stake, and the absence of mitigating factors, we cannot disagree with the Board that a public censure is appropriate and consistent with the sanctions imposed in similar cases. See, e.g., In re Shaw, 775 A.2d at 1125-26 (imposing public censure on attorney who failed to pay a third-pa
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