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Pittman v. City of St. Paul9/23/2003 estified that she was taking the dog out of his kennel when he got away from her. She further testified that she chased the dog alongside the house and saw the boy start running in front of the dog. Relator's daughter claimed that she was able to grab the dog before he reached the boy, who had tripped and fallen on the sidewalk.
The hearing officer also heard the testimony of the boy and his mother. The boy testified that as he was walking alongside relator's house and heard footsteps behind him. When he turned around, he saw the dog running toward him, so he started running. After the boy reached the sidewalk and began to run toward his home, he tripped and fell. The boy testified that at that point, the dog bit him on the ankle. The boy's mother testified that she took her son to the hospital after noticing two small puncture wounds on his ankle. She reported the incident to the city police department after relator denied that her dog had bitten the boy.
Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the officer determined that after relator's daughter had let the dog out of its kennel, he escaped, ran around the house, and chased the nine-year-old boy. The officer further determined that when the boy tripped and fell, the dog bit him. These findings are reasonably supported by the record and testimony at the hearing. These findings further support the ultimate conclusion that the dog is potentially dangerous under the city code because the dog has, when unprovoked, either "bitten a human on public or private property" or "chased or approached a person upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public or private property... in an apparent attitude of attack." Legislative Code §á200.11(a)(1), (2).
Relator further argues that the boy provoked the dog, based on her testimony that the boy was poking sticks into the dog's kennel earlier in the evening. The issue of whether a dog has been provoked is one for the jury or trier of fact; in this case, the hearing officer. Bailey v. Morris, 323 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Minn. 1982) (stating that provocation under dog bite statute, Minn. Stat. § 347.22, is issue of fact properly submitted to jury). The hearing officer here could reasonably determine that the boy did not provoke the dog, particularly when there was no direct link in time between the boy's alleged provocation and the later chase and bite.
Finally, even if the dog did not bite the boy, the hearing officer could still find the dog is potentially dangerous because he was chasing a person in an "apparent attitude of attack." Relator admitted that she had recently purchased a kennel for the dog because he had a habit of chasing running children. And the boy testified that he started running when he turned around and saw the dog running towards him; his testimony supports an inference that he may have believed that the 40-to-60-pound dog was chasing or attacking him. Thus, the hearing officer could also find that the dog fit the second definition of a potentially dangerous dog.
We therefore affirm the restrictions placed on relator's dog and the finding that the dog is potentially dangerous.
Affirmed.
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