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Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.9/4/2003
ing motions for summary judgment is well established. We review summary judgments de novo. Hardy v. Brock, 826 So. 2d 71, 74 (Miss. 2002) (citing Heirs and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Branning ex rel. Tucker v. Hinds Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 So. 2d 311, 314 (Miss. 1999)). The facts are viewed in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Robinson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 732 So. 2d 204, 207 (Miss. 1999)). The existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude summary judgment. Id. The non-moving party may not rest upon allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there exists genuine issues for trial. Id. (citing Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So. 2d 60, 61 (Miss. 1997)).
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A DEFINITION FROM UNINSURED MOTORIST LAW TO LABEL DRIVER "INSURED."
. Grange alleges the trial court erred by concluding Chrisann was covered under John and Cathy's insurance policy. Unlike USF&G;s policy where Chrisann is a named insured, only John and Cathy are named as insured in Grange's policy. The policy also includes a clause insuring "any family member." The policy defines a family member as a person related to the named insured by blood and whose principal residence at the time of the accident was the location listed on the policy's declaration page, i.e. the address of John and Cathy. This Court has held, in evaluating coverage under an uninsured motorist policy, that "a child is a resident of both parents' households until he or she reaches the age of majority or becomes fully emancipated." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 1005, 1011 (Miss. 1993). Prior Mississippi law held that a child was not necessarily a resident of a non-custodial parent's household. Goens v. Arinder, 248 Miss. 806, 161 So. 2d 509, 516 (1964). Goens was disapproved of by Aetna and expressly overruled in Johnson v. Preferred Risk Auto. Ins. Co., 659 So. 2d 866, 875 (Miss. 1995). Grange argues these cases should not apply because they both dealt with uninsured motorist coverage. However, if Johnson was making a distinction between uninsured motorist coverage and liability coverage, there would have been no need to expressly overrule Goens. It is clear that the law in this state is that an unemancipated minor is considered a household resident of both the custodial parent and the non-custodial parent for the purposes of automobile insurance.
. Alternatively, Grange's own statements indicate its belief that Chrisann is a resident of John and Cathy's household. Grange's claim file stated that Chrisann was living at John and Cathy's, that she went "home to Dad's on vacations," that she moved back in with John and Cathy five months before the accident, and that there was " o way we can really claim here residence was not there." Additionally, in a December 13, 1995, letter to USF&G; Grange stated "it is now our belief that a court would find that Chrisann Coker's `principal residence' on the date of loss was the residence on the declarations page of the policy issued to John and Cathy Coker ... Grange Mutual Casualty acknowledges coverage for the aforementioned accident." Grange's naked assertions that Chrisann's residence was at her mother's home are not supported by any facts in the record. The nonmoving party may not rest on pleadings or allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment but must put forth specific facts showing an issue of material fact exists. Grange has put forth nothing but bare assertions that Chrisann's residence was with her mother and grandmother, while USF&G;has produced the admissions of Grange's own claims attorney as evidence. The tr
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