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Guess v. Parrott9/16/2003
es and representation provided by Melrose, Seago, & Lay P.A. without having to compensate Melrose, Seago, & Lay P.A. for those services.
7. Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case, the reasonable value for services for which Melrose, Seago, & Lay P.A. is entitled to recover is $86,500.00 from the $183,750.00 contingency fee generated by the ultimate successful settlement of this case.
Appellant was awarded the remaining funds from the generated fee, and both parties were awarded their costs. Appellant Lloyd T. Kelso & Associates appeal from this order.
Appellant makes several assignments of error and presents the following questions on appeal: Did the trial court commit reversible error (I) by denying its motion to dismiss appellee's motion to determine attorneys' fees; (II) by entering judgment after conducting the hearing without a jury after a request was made for such; (III) in finding that appellee was entitled to recover attorneys' fees of $86,500.00 pursuant to quantum meruit; and (IV) by abusing its discretion by awarding $86,500.00 as that amount was not supported by the evidence. I.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion to dismiss for several reasons, including that appellee failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We disagree.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the question is whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff's claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff's claim.
Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002) (citations omitted).
Appellee's motion alleges that it provided valuable legal services to plaintiff pursuant to its contingency fee agreement. Subsequent to the agreement and services, appellee was unilaterally discharged by plaintiff. The case was settled afterward by another law firm, appellant, which has received compensation. Appellee's motion asked for three alternative remedies, two of which based an award of attorneys' fees in quantum meruit.
The first inquiry is whether such a claim exists. This Court has had occasion to address the issue of whether "an attorney may recover on a contingent fee contract when his clients have discharged him prior to final disposition of the case." Covington v. Rhodes, 38 N.C. App. 61, 63, 247 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1978), disc. review denied, 296 N.C. 410, 251 S.E.2d 468 (1979). In holding that an attorney may not recover on the contract but only the reasonable value of his services, this Court stated:
A contract for legal services is not like other contracts. The client has the right to discharge his attorney at any time, and it is our view that upon such discharge the attorney is entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services he has already provided. As the New York Court noted . . .: "The rule secures to the attorney the right to recover the reasonable value of the services which he has rendered, and is well calculated to promote public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confidential."
Id. at 66, 247 S.E.2d at 309.
Further, in a more recent case, this Court allowed a discharged attorney to pursue an action in quantum meruit against the settli
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