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Guess v. Parrott9/16/2003
ng of fact #12; (8) the hours worked by appellant and its contingency fee contract amount of 35%; (9) the amount charged by the attorneys; (10) settlement offers and results obtained by appellant; (11) the competency of appellee; and (12) the work provided by each firm.
The trial court awarded appellee $86,500.00. This amount represents its proportionate amount, based upon hours of work put into the case, of the total contingency fee, $183,750.00, generated by plaintiff's case.
First, we hold that the trial court made sufficient findings to support its award of attorneys' fee. The trial judge presiding over the hearing on attorneys' fees was the same judge that presided over the mistrial. He was in the best position to make the determination of ability and skill of the parties, as well as to the difficulty of the case.
Secondly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding to appellee the amount that it did, using the method that it did. As we have said, the trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorneys' fees in the present situation, capped only by the principle that a client cannot be required to pay more than the contingent fee to which he agreed with his current counsel (35%). See Merten, 127 N.C. App. at 487, 490 S.E.2d at 592-93. Thus, the trial court could have awarded a fee based on charges for hourly work (X hours at X price = reasonable services). Further, the trial court could have adjusted the award up or down, considering what the true value of the services to the client amounted to in its opinion.
In the present case, the trial court employed a method described by other jurisdictions as "quasi-quantum meruit" recovery. See 56 A.L.R. 5th at 102-03.
he court seemed to employ a "quasi-quantum meruit" approach in that it held that the attorney was entitled to a percentage of the amount awarded the client but that the percentage was to be determined by limiting the sum due from the client to that recovered by the successor attorney and apportioning it by comparing the nature and amount of the work done by the subject attorney to that performed by the successor attorney.
Id. (referring to Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So.2d 102 (La. 1978)); see also Goldstein and Price, P.C. v. Tonkin & Mondl, L.C., 974 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Gary E. Rosenberg, P.C. v. McCormack, 250 A.D.2d 679, 672 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1998). But see Jones & Granger v. Johnson, 788 So.2d 381 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001)) (attorney not entitled to portion of award, but only quantum meruit).
We hold that in North Carolina, a trial court situated as the one in the present case may employ such a method if it believes, in its discretion, that such a method aptly characterizes what the discharged attorney is entitled, or is as much as he deserves.
Therefore, as we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any manner in handling the present matter, its ruling and order is
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and ELMORE concur.
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