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Daniel v. State9/23/2003
Counsel testified that he, Petitioner, Ms. Shepherd, General Hoffer and General Crump met briefly in a separate room during the recess on the first morning of the second trial to explore the possibility of a plea negotiation. At some point, counsel left the room and initiated a conversation with Detective Alvarez concerning the status of any prosecution against Petitioner's family. Detective Alvarez informed counsel that he had completed the necessary affidavits of complaint and applications for warrants for Mr. Daniel, Sr. and Ms. Ledford. Counsel took the paperwork into the conference room and requested that the State agree not to prosecute members of the Daniel family as a part of the plea agreement.
Petitioner was initially indicted on thirteen counts of rape, statutory rape and sexual battery. As a result, he faced significant sentencing exposure if convicted. Petitioner pled guilty to five counts of statutory rape, two counts of sexual battery and one count of rape and received an effective sentence of nine years. At the plea submission hearing, Petitioner said that he understood the plea agreement and the constitutional rights he was foregoing by entering a guilty plea. Petitioner testified that no one had threatened or made any promises or otherwise coerced him into entering the plea agreement and admitted that he had committed the offenses outlined by the State in its factual basis for the plea. Furthermore, the trial court specifically found Petitioner's post-conviction hearing testimony to be without credibility. Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's guilty plea, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that Petitioner's plea was entered into voluntarily and intelligently. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because Petitioner did not have a clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea and the plea was unlawfully induced. Petitioner also alleges that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he was acting under a conflict of interest resulting from the representation of both Petitioner and Dr. Knight. Petitioner does not support his assertions with any specific proof or citations to authority. We do note, however, that "an accused is entitled to zealous representation by an attorney unfettered by a conflicting interest." State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S. Ct. 3288, 1031 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1990). Ineffective assistance of counsel may result if counsel's performance is affected by a conflict of interests. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. This conflict, however, must be more than just a potential conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980). "An actual conflict of interest is usually defined in the context of one attorney representing two or more parties with divergent interests." State v. Tate, 925 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Prejudice is presumed "if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067; Netters v. State, 957 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
The best we can gleam from the record is that Petitioner's counsel represented Dr. Cecil Knight who pled guilty to 23 unspecified felony charges and three misdemeanor charges prior to Defendant's first trial. The charges apparently a
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