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Russell/Packard Development9/18/2003
cause of action, the plaintiffs later renewed their malpractice suit, but only after the statute normally would have run. See id. at 1183-84. Balancing the misinformation the plaintiffs allegedly received against the actions of the plaintiffs in light of this misinformation, the Chapman court determined the plaintiffs were "entitled to their day in court" and reversed a grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1186. The court left for the jury the determination of whether, given the defendant's concealment, the plaintiffs "were sufficiently alerted to the possibility of medical malpractice at the time of [their daughter's] cardiac arrest to start the statute of limitations running or whether . . . [the plaintiffs] should reasonably have disregarded [the misinformation] and made an independent inquiry." Id. In essence, the court left for the fact-finder the determination of whether or not to apply the discovery rule.
Russell's pleadings, set out above, clearly allege that the Appellees mislead and misinformed Russell as to CMT's true nature and involvement in the sale of the lots. Under our standard of review in a grant of a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and in light of the foregoing authority regarding the fact-finder's role in determining the applicability of the discovery rule, we hold the district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions to dismiss.
II. Standing as to Fraud Claim
Alternatively, the Appellees argue the district court properly dismissed Russell's fraud claim because Russell lacks standing to bring the claim. Russell alleges in the pleadings that when PRP was dissolved in 1997, PRP assigned to Russell "all of its rights, title and interest in the Contract." Russell argues this assignment "includ any claims relating to the purchase of lots." The Appellees argue, inter alia, that Russell lacks standing because it could not have legally acquired a cause of action for fraud from PRP through assignment. Accordingly, we must determine whether a fraud claim is assignable in Utah.
We conclude that Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P.2d 611 (1936), is controlling in this appeal. The facts and procedural posture of Mayer are strikingly similar to those we face here. In Mayer, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant for fraud alleging that the defendant "'devised a scheme to defraud the plaintiff's assignors . . . by selling them stock . . . at false and fictitious values.'" Id. at 613. Based on the defendant's misrepresentations, the plaintiff's assignors purchased the stock at a price higher than its actual trading value, providing the defendant with significant ill-gotten profits. See id. at 613-614. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action, asserting the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the fraud claim because a cause of action for fraud was not assignable. See id. at 612, 616. The supreme court noted that although tort claims were not assignable at common law, "the rule of nonassignability no longer extends to all actions arising [in tort]" under Utah law. Id. (citing Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 9 Utah 228, 33 P. 1042, 1045 (1893) (holding that an action for negligent destruction of property is assignable); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, 654 (1913) (same); Lawler v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55 P. 60, 61 (1898) (holding that an action for money overpaid by mutual mistake is assignable); Baglin v. Earl-Eagle Min. Co., 54 Utah 572, 184 P. 190, 193 (1919) (holding that a cause of action for conversion is assignable)). The Mayer court also pointed out that the Utah Supreme Court had previously held an action to recover stock secured by fraud was an assignable claim. Id. at 616 (citing
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