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Keller v. Kraft9/23/2003
. Christopher J. and Amy Keller appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint against James R. Kraft and the City of Milwaukee. The Kellers contend that their claim falls into the third exception within the worker's compensation statute, Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (2001-02), thus permitting recovery for injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident between co-employees. They assert the trial court erred in concluding that their claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the worker's compensation law. Because the facts of this case trigger the third co-employee exception within § 102.03(2), the trial court erred in ruling that the Kellers' complaint was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the worker's compensation law. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
. On August 31, 2000, Christopher Keller was driving his personal automobile while on duty as a firefighter with the Milwaukee Fire Department. Keller was en route to a grocery store to purchase supplies for a meal at the firehouse. At the same time, Kraft, who was on duty as a Milwaukee Police officer, was driving a Milwaukee Police Department vehicle. At or near the intersection of West Wells Street and James Lovell Street, the two vehicles collided, allegedly as the result of Kraft's negligence. Keller's vehicle was totaled and he suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident. It is undisputed that Keller received worker 's compensation benefits from the City of Milwaukee.
. On June 7, 2002, the Kellers filed a summons and complaint against Kraft and the City to seek compensation for personal injuries. Kraft and the City filed an answer alleging, among other things, that the worker 's compensation law was the exclusive remedy for any injuries resulting from this accident. Kraft and the City filed a motion for summary judgment on that basis. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The Kellers now appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
. The issue in this case involves the interpretation of the worker 's compensation statute and the third exception provided within Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2), relating to suits between co-employees. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, , 251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158. In interpreting statutes, our goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and " he first step in any statutory analysis is to look at the language of the statute." Hutson v. State of Wis. Personnel Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, , ___ Wis. 2d ___, 665 N.W.2d 212 (citation omitted). In order to ascertain legislative intent, we may also examine "the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute." Garibay v. Circuit Court, 2002 WI App 164, , 256 Wis. 2d 438, 647 N.W.2d 455.
. The language of the statute at issue in this case provides:
Where such conditions exist the right to the recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other employee of the same employer and the worker 's compensation insurance carrier. This section does not limit the right of an employee to bring action against any co-employee for an assault intended to cause bodily harm, or against a co-employee for negligent operation of a motor vehicle not owned or leased by the employer, or against a co-employee of the same employer to the extent that there would be liability of a governmental unit to pay judgments against employees under a collective bargaining agreement or a local ordinance.
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (emphasis added). The dispute centers on the emphasized language, which we refer to as the thir
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