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In re Estate of Seader9/23/2003
15, 1318 (1947)). This quoted language, taken from an annotation concerning enforcement of a contract to adopt, appears to be at least an indirect acceptance of the concept of equitable adoption. However, the quoted language is followed immediately in the opinion by this sentence: "Our difficulty here is that an adult is involved." Pangarova, 419 P.2d at 695. Thereafter, we pursued neither that general issue -- adoption of an adult -- nor the specific issue of equitable adoption of an adult. Instead, we cited several cases where the contract being enforced in equity was not simply a contract to adopt, but also contained a promise to make the adoptee an heir. Id. at 69596.
On appeal after retrial, a jury verdict in favor of the niece was affirmed. Nichols v. Pangarova, 443 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 1968). While reference is made in the second opinion to "a contract that decedent would adopt her and make her his heir," the concept of equitable adoption is not directly discussed. Nichols, 443 P.2d at 758. Instead, the discussion focuses on "a contract to devise or bequeath property," "an oral contract to make a will," and "an agreement to will property." Id. at 759, 761 and 762. In the final analysis, Pangarova is fundamentally not an equitable adoption case.
One other Wyoming case must be mentioned. We have already cited Matter of Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d at 552, for the proposition that substantial compliance with the adoption statutes is required for a legal adoption to occur. The case also holds as follows:
Adoption in Wyoming is a statutory proceeding and cannot be accomplished by private contract. It is held that: "If the relation of adoptive parent and child cannot be created by a private contract, it is equally certain that it cannot arise by estoppel."
Id. at 554 ( quoting 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, § 8 (1962)). Upon first reading, this language might appear to be an outright renunciation of the concept of equitable adoption (adoption by estoppel), but the facts and procedural status of the case indicate otherwise. The appellant had filed a petition to adopt his fiancée's two children. After the couple married, a decree was entered purporting to be a final decree of adoption. The couple soon separated, however, and the appellant filed a petition to have the adoptions vacated. He contended that the adoptions had been granted without compliance with statutory mandates. Matter of Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d at 551-52.
The district court held that the appellant was estopped from contesting the validity of the adoptions because he had invoked the jurisdiction of the court, because he had failed to show material misrepresentations, and because it was in the best interests of the children that the adoption be confirmed. Id. at 552. This is the context in which this Court, in agreeing with the appellant, held that the legal status of adoption may only be created by statutory compliance, and that estoppel cannot be applied to avoid statutory mandates. Id. at 553-54. Clearly, that holding had nothing to do with the traditional concept of utilizing equitable adoption to protect a promised inheritance in an intestate estate.
Matter of Adoption of AMD, like Nugent and Pangarova, left considerable doubt as to the status of equitable adoption in Wyoming. Because the instant case also fails to resemble the typical situation in which the doctrine is applied, it will have the same effect. If Neil had died intestate, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2003) would apply and his estate would have gone " o his children surviving, and the descendents of his children who are dead...." The "simple" question then would be whether to apply equitable adoption so
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