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In re Estate of Seader9/23/2003
ateral relative. The problem is that Julie was not the lineal descendent of Neil's grandparent either biologically or by legal adoption. Legislative intent is certainly clear that, had Julie been adopted, she would be considered Neil's child, and would then be a lineal descendent under the statutes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-114(b) (LexisNexis 2003). But, on its face, the anti-lapse statute just as clearly makes no provision for step-children or other persons who have not been legally adopted. And in that regard, the words of the statute are not ambiguous. A lineal descendent is a lineal descendent. We cannot create an ambiguity within the statute by asking whether we should apply an equitable doctrine to broaden the class of persons identified by the statute.
The primary function of equitable adoption is to enforce a child's right to inherit from someone who promised, but failed, to adopt that child, and then died intestate. Because the putative adoptive parent died without a will, there was neither a testamentary inheritance nor a testamentary disinheritance, either of which was an available option for the decedent (unless there was also a specific promise to make a will or leave an inheritance). Equitable adoption is used to fill that intent "gap" by allowing the child to inherit as if she had been adopted. Where a will has been made, however, there is no gap to be filled. We know the decedent's intent from the terms of the will. In the instant case, we do not need equitable adoption to enforce Neil's intent to leave a portion of his estate to Julie -- Neil did that himself in his will.
This case serves as a good example of why the doctrine of equitable adoption should not be applied to testate estates -- the result may negate both legislative and testamentary intent. The specific facts of this case also raise another consideration: when the child seeking recognition of adoptive status is a step-child brought into the home by the marriage of her mother to the putative adoptive father, the inference does not necessarily follow that there was a promise to adopt. A court may infer such a promise in cases where biological parents relinquish their child to others. The same inference may not be appropriate, however, when a mother brings her child into the home of her new husband. In that situation, there may be an equal inference that the father-child or stepfather-stepchild relationship merely arose out of the domestic status of the parties. J.C.J., Jr., Note, supra, 58 Va. L. Rev. at 737-38; George A. Locke, Annotation, Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347, § 26 at 65-67 (June 2003 Supp.). See also, Rebecca C. Bell, supra, XXIX Stetson L. Rev. at 430 and George C. Sims, Comment, Adoption by Estoppel: History and Effect, XV Baylor L. Rev. 162, 168-69 (1963).
As for the stepparent-stepchild relationship in this case, that relationship calls for particular circumspection before recognizing an equitable adoption. Courts have seldom applied the doctrine of equitable adoption or its equivalents to treat a stepparent as an adoptive parent.... One reason is the appreciation that it is in the public interest for stepparents to be generous and loving with their stepchildren. Such conduct could be discouraged if a consequence of such kindness toward a stepchild would be the imposition on the stepparent of the legal incidents of parenthood, such as a duty to provide child support after divorce or a reallocation of the stepparent's estate after death.
Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 362 (N.M.App. 1998).
Finally, although it is part of the probate code chapter dealing with intestate succession, Wyo. Stat. An
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