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Cortez v. Ceres Unified School District3/5/2003
ion.'" As explained above, Cortez's argument-that Cortez could not have been on an excursion because he was on school property-is not supported by the cases he cites nor the statute itself. Rather, "the voluntary nature of the event absolves the district of liability." (Castro, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 236.) The trial court was correct in its grant of summary judgment.
Waiver
Cortez next argues that summary judgment was improper because a question of fact existed regarding whether Cortez's father understood the waiver form that he signed. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Cortez presented his father's declaration, in English, stating he did not understand he was waiving any rights when he signed the waiver form. District's evidentiary objections to the declaration were sustained, and Cortez does not challenge those evidentiary holdings on appeal. Rather, he contends "the fact that Alejandro Cortez does not understand English was established by way of other evidence produced in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment."
Cortez appears to recognize the general rule that his father's inability to speak English does not excuse the father from accepting the result of his signature on the waiver form (i.e., a release of all claims). "`Ordinarily, one who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he had not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.'" (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163, quoting 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) ยง 120, p. 145.) Cortez contends, however, that this case falls outside of the general rule because he presented a question of fact regarding whether District had "reason to believe that [his father] could not understand the Voluntary Activities Participation Form." He contends that District had "notice" of appellant's parents' "language abilities." We disagree.
First, we note that the 1994 form on which appellant relies reveals that appellant's parents did not request for school papers to be sent home in Spanish and that they spoke to their child in English and Spanish. Further, District presented evidence that as of 1998, Cortez's parents reported the language most often spoken by adults at home as English, and even the document Cortez relies on to claim his father did not understand English states that he spoke English to his children at home. Most important, however-and critical to our decision here-Cortez makes no claim of fraud or misrepresentation with respect to his father signing the release form. A parent cannot avoid the implications of a waiver he signed by claiming the other party should have known he would not understand it. If Cortez's father did not understand the form, he should not have signed it. Absent fraud, coercion, or excusable neglect-and the inability to speak English does not constitute excusable neglect-Cortez's father's signature legally binds him to the terms of the release form. (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 160-163.) Summary judgment was proper.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
WE CONCUR:
DIBIASO, Acting P.J.
WISEMAN, J.
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