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De Avila v. Estate of DeHerrera3/13/2003
ent is void . . . or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
A grant or denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233 (Colo. 2001); Blesch v. Denver Publishing Co., ___ P.3d ___ (Colo. App. No. 01CA0728, Nov. 21, 2002).
C.R.C.P. 60 is not a substitute for appeal, but instead is meant to provide relief in the interest of justice in extraordinary circumstances. E.B. Jones Construction Co. v. City & County of Denver, 717 P.2d 1009 (Colo. App. 1986). Thus, a C.R.C.P. 60 motion generally cannot be used to circumvent the operation of C.R.C.P. 59(j).
Exceptions to this rule occur when the facts of a case constitute an "extreme situation" warranting relief from judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) or when the judgment is void. See Sandoval v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 752 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Colo. App. 1988); see also People in Interest of J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo. 2002)(C.R.C.P. 60(b) balances the preferred rule of finality of judgments and the need to provide relief in the interest of justice in exceptional cases). Therefore, defendant's claim for relief cannot be granted under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1).
Further, C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) has been narrowly interpreted to include only extreme situations and extraordinary circumstances. Davidson v. McClellan, supra.
Also, where a judgment is void, relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) is mandatory because from its inception, a void judgment was a complete nullity and without legal effect. Consequently, there is no judgment the propriety of which a court can review. First National Bank v. Fleisher, 2 P.3d 706 (Colo. 2000).
Here, whether relief from the original judgment was appropriate under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) or (5) turns on the meaning of § 15-12-803(3)(b). Defendant asserts that § 15-12-803 is a non-claim statute and an absolute bar to enforcement of untimely claims, such as plaintiff's personal injury action, except to the extent of insurance limits. We conclude that § 15-12-803 is not an absolute bar, and thus, the original judgment was not void.
Section 15-12-803, provides in pertinent part as follows: (1)All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent . . . are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: (a)A claim based on a contract with the personal representative, within four months after performance by the personal representative is due; (b)Any other claim, within four months after it arises.
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: . . .
(b) To the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance
Section 15-12-803 is a non-claim statute, not a statute of limitations. See In re Estate of Ongaro, 998 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 2000).
In cases prior to Ongaro, the supreme court had held that § 15-12-803(2) creates a jurisdictional bar to a claim untimely filed against a decedent's estate. See In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981); In re Estate of Randall, 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153 (1968).
In Ongaro, the court addressed the one-year period under § 15-12-803(1)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2002. It concluded that § 15-12-803(1), C.R.S. 2002, does not divest courts of jurisdiction over untimely claims against estates, but nevertheless interpreted that section to bar the enforcement of the late-filed c
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