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City of Coconut Creek v. City of Deerfield Beach3/19/2003
g, among other grounds, Coconut Creek's failure to comply with the statutory presuit notice requirement. After a September 13, 2001, hearing, on September 19, 2001, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the complaint. On September 28, 2001, Coconut Creek filed the amended complaint under review. Though Coconut Creek alleges it complied with all conditions precedent under section 163.3215, it acknowledges that it never filed a separate verified complaint with Deerfield Beach. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice following a February 22, 2002, hearing, and this appeal followed.
Section 163.3215(4) is clear. A complaining party
shall first file a verified complaint with the local government whose actions are complained of setting forth the facts upon which the complaint is based and the relief sought by the complaining party. The verified complaint shall be filed no later than 30 days after the alleged inconsistent action has been taken.
It is undisputed that Coconut Creek never complied with this condition precedent.
Where the presuit notice requirement of section 163.3215(4) has not been met, case law is clear in this and every other district that has considered the issue that the action should be dismissed. See Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth of the Treasure Coast, Inc., 608 So. 2d 509, 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("We understand Section 163.3215 . . . to require that a court challenge the consistency of a zoning order with the comprehensive plan which does not merely seek a temporary restraining order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm be preceded by timely filing of a complaint with the entity that entered the order. Because this condition precedent was not met, we find that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter."); Lee v. St. Johns County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 776 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("Legislative intent is clear that a challenge to a development order must be brought within the narrow time limits of section 163.3215 or not at all."); Brady v. City of Jacksonville, 764 So. 2d 715, 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Because [appellants] failed to comply with a condition precedent under section 163.3215(4) . . . before filing their verified complaint in circuit court, we affirm the circuit court's denial of relief."); Bal Harbour Vill. v. City of N. Miami, 678 So. 2d 356, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Seminole County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 623 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (complaint filed with county more than thirty days after development order rendered required dismissal).
Prior to the 1985 adoption of the Growth Management Act, the common law required that a party seeking to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan show that it had a legally recognized right, apart from the general public's, which was adversely affected by the order. See Citizen's Growth Mgmt. Coalition, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 450 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1984). The Growth Management Act liberalized standing. See Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), review denied, 821 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2002). Edgewater Beach Owners Ass'n v. Walton County, 833 So. 2d 215, 219-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Coconut Creek's right to challenge the consistency of Energy Center's site plan approval with Broward County's Comprehensive Plan is a creature of statute. See Fla. Wildlife Fed'n v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980) (broadening of standing to seek enforcement of environmental law is substantive, not procedural). As such, the statute must be strictly construed. See
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