 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.12/29/2000
pted the doctrine of comparative negligence for fault-based tort actions and abolished the older, harsher doctrine of contributory negligence, which completely barred a plaintiff's recovery if he was to some degree at fault for his injuries. Under the "pure" system of comparative fault adopted by the court, a plaintiff would still be able to recover if he was comparatively at fault for his injuries, but his recovery would be reduced in proportion to his percentage of fault.
Less than a year later, in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., we held that comparative negligence principles also apply to products liability actions based on strict liability. But we held that comparative negligence in strict products liability cases was limited to two specific situations: (1) when the plaintiff knows that the product is defective and unreasonably and voluntarily proceeds to use it; and (2) when the plaintiff misuses the product and the misuse is a proximate cause of the injuries.
Later cases have confirmed that comparative negligence in strict products liability is limited to product misuse and unreasonable assumption of risk. Ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to establish comparative negligence on the part of a products liability plaintiff.
Recently, in General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth we had the opportunity to further clarify our case law on this issue. We noted that litigants sometimes misread Dura Corp. v. Harned as holding that product misuse is not sufficient to raise a jury question on comparative negligence in a strict products liability action. We pointed out that, like our other case law, Dura recognizes two types of comparative negligence in strict liability cases: (1) knowing product misuse where the misuse is a proximate cause of the injuries and (2) unreasonable and voluntary assumption of risk with respect to a defective product. The Dura court limited its discussion to the latter type of comparative negligence because the defendant in the case did not allege product misuse.
Farnsworth clarified our pre-1986 case law but it did not address the question currently before us, namely, whether the 1986 Tort Reform Act changed the definition of comparative negligence in strict products liability cases to include ordinary negligence. Although the events in Farnsworth took place after the passage of the 1986 Tort Reform Act, the opinion did not discuss the effects of that Act, nor did it need to. Even if the Act expanded comparative negligence in products liability to include ordinary negligence, such an expansion would have been irrelevant in Farnsworth. The defendants in Farnsworth never alleged ordinary comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff; instead they alleged product misuse -- the defense was that plaintiff wore a seatbelt under her arm rather than across her body.
B. The 1986 Tort Reform Act Modified the Definition of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability Actions to Include Ordinary Negligence.
In 1986 the Alaska Legislature passed the Tort Reform Act. Modeled after the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, the Tort Reform Act was intended to "to create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the availability and affordability of insurance." The legislature hoped to reduce the costs of the tort system while still ensuring "that adequate and appropriate compensation for persons injured through the fault of others" remained available.
As part of the Act, the legislature enacted a rule of comparative fault similar to the doctrine of comparative negligence which this court had adopted a decade earlier:
In an action bas
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Alaska Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|