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Alabama Department of Finance v. Adams12/1/2000
David L. Adams is a law-enforcement officer employed by the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board ("the ABC Board"). Adams was scheduled to be off on November 7, 1997; however, he went to his place of employment to pick up his paycheck and to complete some paperwork. While there, he suffered a heart attack. As a result of this heart attack, Adams was absent from work from November 7, 1997, until January 26, 1998.
On November 10, 1997, Adams's supervisor completed an "Employer's First Report of Injury or Occupational Disease" form and submitted it to the Alabama Department of Finance, Division of Risk Management. The First Report of Injury form stated that Adams's heart attack was caused by an " ccupational disease as defined in Title 36-30-20, Code of Alabama."
On November 26, 1997, the State Employee Injury Compensation Trust Fund (SEICTF) denied coverage to Adams, based on its determination that "the benefits under the Program are not applicable because [Adams was] diagnosed with a medical condition that is not work related." On January 20, 1998, Adams appealed this denial to the SEICTF Review Board.
In April 1998, while his appeal was pending before the SEICTF Review Board, Adams filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County against the ABC Board, the State Personnel Board, and the State Department of Finance, seeking a judgment declaring that he was entitled to be compensated for an occupational disease that resulted in his temporary inability to perform work-related duties and declaring which state agency was responsible for compensating him. In August 1998, the circuit court issued an order, which dismissed the ABC Board and the State Personnel Board, and stated, in part:
"Adams contends that [§§á36-30-20 through -23, Ala. Code 1975,] [entitle] him to compensation because he suffered from a compensable occupational disease as defined in §á36-30- 20(4)[, Ala. Code 1975]. He appears to contend that [§§á36- 30-20 through -23] should be read in pari materia with [§§á36- 29A-1 through -8, Ala. Code 1975] and the [SEICTF] should award him compensation as directed by §á36-30-21; or he contends that the term `occupational disease', as defined in §á36-30-20(4), should be added to or engrafted onto the definition of `occupational disease' ... in Ala. Admin. Code 355-8-1-.05(a)(1) (1995); or he contends that some other agency should pay benefits.
"The court has considered §§á36-30-1 through -23, and it appears that the Board of Adjustment is the awarding authority for death benefits and the State Employees Retirement Systems is the awarding authority for benefits due as a result of occupational disease. By definition, Adams qualifies for occupational disease benefits, §á36-30-20(3), provided he meets the requirements of §§á36-30-22 and -23. Section 36- 29A-5 provides that the benefits provided by §§á36-30-20 to - 23 are not affected by the State Employee Injury Compensation Program. Thus, the statutory provisions appear to have separate fields of operation. However, the State Employees Retirement System is not a party to this litigation; therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaration binding against it.
"....
"It is Ordered, as follows:
"....
"2. The motion to dismiss filed by [the State Department of Finance] is denied, at this time.
"3. Within 14 days of the date of this order, [Adams] shall add the State Employees Retirement Systems as a defendant to this action. If he does not, the action will be dismissed."
In September 1998, the circuit court dismissed the action, without prejudice, when Adams failed to comply wi
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