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Eagle v. State12/6/2000
ivate residence and robbed the occupants at gun and knife-point. Rudolph was identified by the victims who stated that he was the one wielding the gun. Calvin Lee's fingerprints were found at the scene, and he later admitted to robbing the house. This is unquestionably a serious crime involving premeditation and violence, and both appellants had prior juvenile offenses. The trial judge noted that prospects for rehabilitation are slim because all previous attempts have failed; furthermore, both of the appellants are now over the age of eighteen and are not eligible for juvenile programs. See Wright v. State, 331 Ark. 173, 959 S.W.2d 50 (1998).
Calvin additionally argues that he was deprived of a meaningful hearing under Thompson v. State, 330 Ark. 746, 957 S.W.2d 1 (1997), because none of the victims testified at the transfer hearing. This argument is without merit. Thompson merely holds that the trial judge may not base a denial of a motion to transfer solely upon the allegations contained in the information. In the present case, there was evidence that Calvin confessed to the crime, and his fingerprints were found at the crime scene. Police officers who investigated the crime testified without objection that a gun and a knife were employed in the robbery. This is far more than the mere allegations presented in Thompson and, although the testimony of the police officers regarding the victim's statements was hearsay, hearsay evidence admitted without objection can constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction. Williams v. State, 65 Ark. App. 176, 986 S.W.2d 123 (1999).
Rudolph argues that the court erred by mentioning certain factors relating only to Calvin in its findings, asserting that the trial court must make an evaluation of "the specific offense and the individual defendant" under Fleetwood v. State, 329 Ark. 327, 947 S.W.2d 387 (1997). Appellant is reading Fleetwood too narrowly. Fleetwood says, in essence, that a juvenile is not automatically entitled to a transfer to juvenile court simply because he pleads self-defense:
The defense conceded that the offense was both serious and violent but claims that the denial of the motion to transfer was improper because of the affirmative defense of self-defense. The statutory scheme for determining whether a case should be transferred to juvenile court is not dependent upon affirmative defenses. A trial court must evaluate the specific offense and the individual defendant to determine whether a transfer is warranted. It is obvious that Fleetwood was allowed to offer evidence to support his motion; and we have often held that a trial court is in the best position to weigh such evidence. We will not question such a ruling absent evidence that the trial court was clearly erroneous. Fleetwood v. State, 329 Ark. 327, 331, 947 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1997).
We note that there was no assertion of self-defense in the present case. Apparently, appellant's argument is that the form employed by the trial judge was improper because he combined his findings regarding both appellants in one opinion, rather than writing separate opinions dealing solely with the factors relating to each of them individually. However, while the trial judge wrote a single opinion, he clearly distinguished between the appellants, identifying which factors applied to each of them individually and setting out the reasoning supporting his evaluation. Fleetwood simply does not address matters of form, and we hold that the statutory requirement of written findings concerning enumerated factors was complied with.
Affirmed.
Hart and Meads, JJ., agree.
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