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Lane v. Deere and Co.3/21/2003
pp., 986 S.W.2d 452, 455 (1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, Ky., 281 S.W.2d 891, 894 (1955), overruled in part by Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (1969)). See also Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694, 705 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1154, 116 S. Ct. 1034, 134 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1996)."A matter is considered collateral if >the matter itself is not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness.=@ Id. (quoting United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) and 1 McCormack on Evidence ' 45 at 169). The purpose for this rule is "to minimize confusion for the triers of fact by avoiding an unwarranted and endless proliferation of side issues." Id. (quoting Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, ' 4.10, p. 177 (3d ed. Michie 1993)).
According to Little's deposition testimony, he worked for Kingsley for 25 years and sold hundreds of dozers. Of the two witnesses proffered by the appellants, one testified that he knew about side screens but could not recall his discussion with Little. The other testified that he could not remember one way or the other if there was a discussion of the brush screens. Because of the witnesses' inability to recall their discussions with Little, the impeachment value of the proffered testimony was minimal.
The proffered testimony was clearly attempted impeachment on a collateral issue. The trial court has broad discretion regarding the decision as to whether to admit evidence that contradicts a witness's testimony at trial. Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 788, 792 (1969). The value of the evidence for a legitimate purpose was slight, and there was a potential that the jury could misuse the information for an improper purpose. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the proposed impeachment. Baker Pool Co. v. Bennett, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 335, 338 (1967).
In his deposition testimony, Little stated that he met with Vier Kingsley, the owner of Kingsley Equipment Company, and Kingsley's attorney on two occasions prior to his deposition.
The appellants contend that the trial court erred by ruling this testimony inadmissible as evidence of Little's bias, especially because the trial court permitted Little's testimony that he was fond of Denniston, which the appellants allege suggests that Little was not biased.
Evidence that may suggest bias or prejudice on the part of a witness is not collateral and is relevant to impeach the credibility of that witness at trial. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437, 447 (1997). "Any proof that tends to expose a motivation to slant testimony one way or another satisfies the requirement of relevancy. The range of possibilities is unlimited...." Id. (citing R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, ' 4.15, p. 183 (3rd ed. Michie 1993)).
Contrary to the appellants' allegation, evidence concerning Little's meetings with Vier Kingsley and Kingsley's attorney was permitted. The Little deposition tape played to the jury included references to the meetings, and even included testimony regarding the content of the meetings. Further, a review of Little's deposition testimony discloses that his description of the meetings does not suggest bias, but rather that the purpose of the meetings was for Little to explain to Kingsley's attorney his knowledge regarding the circumstances surrounding Denniston's purchase of the dozer.
In support of their position that testimony regarding the meetings was admissible to prove bias, the appellants cite us to Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. McKee, Ky. App., 834 S.W.2
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