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Summers v. Summers3/20/2003
atement is largely a matter addressed to the trial court's discretion. On the record before us, we conclude that defendant's attorney was merely outlining the evidence to be submitted. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that an error, plain or otherwise, occurred.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant's attorney tried to persuade defendant to state that he was driving twenty-five miles per hour when the accident occurred. On cross-examination of defendant, his attorney asked defendant if he estimated the speed of the slow moving vehicle in front of him at twenty-five miles per hour. MRE 611(b) states that a witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. "The judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination." MRE 611(b). MRE 611(c)(2) states that leading questions should ordinarily be permitted on cross-examination. We conclude that defendant's attorney did not commit an error with regard to his questioning of defendant because the issue of speed was addressed during the direct examination and because the attorney could ask leading questions during the cross-examination of defendant.
Plaintiff also argues that her questionnaire for Dr. Wooten and the report of Dr. Fenske were altered. However, neither the questionnaire nor the report were admitted into evidence. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that an error occurred.
Plaintiff also argues that while defendant's trial exhibit C, an unemployment claim form, contains her signature, the answers to the questions were not written by her. We note that plaintiff did not object when defendant moved for the admission of this exhibit. We further note that plaintiff does not argue that the information on this form is incorrect. We conclude that plaintiff has failed to show that an error occurred in the admission of this evidence.
Plaintiff also contends that the jurors were biased because plaintiff was suing her husband and that this bias affected the jurors' verdict. We disagree. We note that three of the jurors plaintiff now claims were biased were either dismissed for cause or excused. Therefore, none of these jurors could have affected the verdict. The remaining jurors were not challenged for cause by plaintiff, and no post-trial motion concerning their alleged bias was filed in the trial court. An argument that was not raised below and was not addressed by the trial court is not preserved for appellate review. Camden v Kaufman, 240 Mich App 389, 400, n 2; 613 NW2d 335 (2000). Therefore, we decline to address this issue.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not assisting her in the introduction of evidence at the trial. We disagree. "The principal limitation on a court's discretion over matters of trial conduct is that its actions not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality." People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1 (1996) (citing People v Burgess, 153 Mich App 715, 719; 396 NW2d 814 (1986)). We conclude that the trial court did not err by not assisting plaintiff with the introduction of evidence because this would have pierced the veil of judicial impartiality.
Affirmed.
Bill Schuette
David H. Sawyer
Kurtis T. Wilder
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