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Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming3/11/2003
addressed whether a man who cared for and maintained a home for another person was covered under the workers'-compensation act or was considered a "domestic servant." Anderson v. Ueland, 197 Minn. 518, 522, 267 N.W. 517, 519 (1936). The court held that he was a "domestic servant" because he cared for another's home. Id. In Berger v. Church of St. Patrick, the issue was whether a woman who maintained the priest's house and church linens/supplies was a domestic servant. Berger v. Church of St. Patrick, 212 Minn. 345, 348, 3 N.W.2d 590, 592 (1942). The court found that the woman was a housekeeper and a domestic servant. Id. at 347, 3 N.W.2d at 592 Also in Eichholz v. Shaft, the court held that "employees who are employed exclusively in the care of the family home and on serving the members" are not intended to be covered by workers' compensation action. Eichholz v. Shaft, 166 Minn. 339, 342, 208 N.W. 18, 19 (1926).
Because Geng and Cooper were not "domestic employees," the exception to the exclusion does not apply. As railroad employees who sustained bodily injuries in the scope and course of their employment, Geng and Cooper are excluded from coverage under Progressive's policy, and the district court's ruling to the contrary was error and must be reversed.
Because the employee exclusion applies, we need not address the second exclusion on which Progressive relies. Nor do we need to address the district court's ruling that the third-party claims were not asserted by employees and thus cannot be excluded under employee exclusions. No party argued that ruling on appeal or cited any authority for it. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (holding issues not argued in briefs must be deemed waived). Furthermore, the third-party plaintiff did allege that the Soo Line was negligent and that the negligence caused the employees' injuries. Thus, the third-party claims were inextricably tied to the employees' claims.
Applicability of Collateral Estoppel
Progressive's policy contains an exclusion from coverage for liability that an insured has assumed under a separate contract or agreement. However, the policy provides an exception to the exclusion for an "insured contract," namely, a contract pertaining to the insured's business "under which you assume the tort liability of another to pay for 'bodily injury ' * * * to a third party or organization."
Brown's contends that its agreement to indemnify CTS and the Soo Line for "all claims, demands, costs and expenses including attorney and court costs" for accidents and injuries to Soo Line employees is an "insured contract" and is excepted from the exclusion.
The district court ruled that Brown's indemnity agreement "is a qualifying 'insured contract'," and, therefore, "Brown's Crew Car's duty to reimburse Soo Line's defense costs is covered under Progressive's Policy." But then the court ruled that, because the issue of whether Brown's agreement is an insured contract previously had been decided against Brown's, Brown's is collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue in the present action.
In a prior federal declaratory-judgment action, the district court was asked to determine whether Brown's indemnity agreement was an insured contract under Progressive's policy. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brown's Crew Car of Wy., Inc., 27 F. Supp.2d 1288, 1293 (D. Wy. 1998). Brown's, CTS, and Progressive were parties to that action, but the railroad involved was the Union Pacific. The district court ruled that the issue in dispute was Brown's contractual obligation to pay defense costs and that such an obligation does not come within the definition of insured contract. The court noted,
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