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Peterson v. BASF Corp.3/11/2003
rty, and it cites N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265, 84 S. Ct. 710, 718 (1964) (libel). This consumer fraud action, however, does not raise a libel claim. Again, there is no support for BASF's claim that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the magazine article because of First Amendment concerns.
Finally, BASF argues that its employees' statements at the official meeting of the North Dakota Pesticide Control Board were absolutely privileged under North Dakota laws. The code states that "every person * * * has the right of protection from bodily restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to the person's personal relations." N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-01 (1997) (emphasis added). It provides that a communication made " n any legislative or judicial proceeding or in any other proceeding authorized by law" is a privileged communication. Id. § 14-02-05(2) (1997). BASF contends that if the statements pertain to the official proceeding, they are absolutely privileged, even if they are false and made with malice. See Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73, 78 (N.D. 1991) (addressing privilege in a defamation action). BASF's argument is flawed for the same reason that its First Amendment argument fails: this is a consumer fraud action, not a defamation action. Consequently, there is no support for BASF's claim that these statements to the North Dakota Pesticide Control Board were protected by privilege. In conclusion, we note that as to these three claims, BASF cites no direct authority to support its arguments that the evidence was not admissible and has demonstrated no prejudicial error.
BASF next contends that evidence of its reports about possible off-label use by its dealers, the Sugarbeet Grower article, and its appearance before the North Dakota Pesticide Board were irrelevant to the claim of consumer fraud.
Relevant evidence is that having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 401.
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. The district court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent an erroneous view of the law or an abuse of discretion. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 138.
This evidence was discussed at length at trial and was relevant to the farmers' claim that BASF violated the NJCFA. BASF has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Finally, BASF contends that the district court improperly allowed the jury to consider what it characterizes as claims of deceptive labeling and differential pricing. This court has considered and rejected most of these claims. Peterson I, 618 N.W.2d at 824. To the extent they were already considered, these arguments are stricken. Further, our review shows that the evidence presented and the arguments made were addressed to the issue of consumer fraud. There is no showing of error.
IV.
BASF contends that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to decertify the class. In support of this argument, it engages first in an extensive discussion of choice-of-law doctrine and certification law.
In Peterson I, this court addressed BASF's challenge to the certification of the farmers as a class for purposes of their NJCFA claim, reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 618 N.W.2d at 825-26. This court concluded that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying [the farmers] as a class on their New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act c
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