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Kelly v. City of Bridgeport12/5/2000
o. 91-32, had amended § 31-275 effective July 1, 1991, to include in subdivision (4) a definition of compensation similar to that contained in § 31-293.
The city argues that the board's reliance on the definition of "compensation" contained in § 31-293, the third party lien statute, to define "compensation payments" in § 31-284b is improper. We agree. Section 31-293 provides that "the word `compensation,' as used in this section, shall be construed to include . . . sums paid out for surgical, medical and hospital services . . . ." (Emphasis added.) By the words of the statute themselves, that definition of "compensation" applies only to § 31-293 and not to § 31-284b. Furthermore, § 31-275, as amended by P.A. 91-32 to include a definition of compensation similar to that previously contained in § 31-293, does not apply to this case. The claimant's substantive right to benefits is governed by the law as it existed on the date of his injury . Iacomacci v. Trumbull, 209 Conn. 219, 222, 550 A.2d 640 (1988); see Civardi v. Norwich, 231 Conn. 287, 293 n.8, 649 A.2d 523 (1994) (applying version of § 31-275 at time of injury rather than using amended version to define "compensation").
Construing the statutes as they existed at the time of the plaintiff's injury , we conclude that the term "compensation payments" as used in § 31-284b (a) does not include payments for medical care after the indemnity compensation period has ceased. The statute mandates that an employer is required to continue insurance benefits only while an employee is receiving "compensation payments" for disability under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The plaintiff argues that the board's decision should be affirmed because the board sought to further the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act by enforcing the express objective of § 31-284b (a) that seeks to "maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries . . . ." General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 31-275 (14) defines the term "income" as "all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment, including wages, accident and health insurance coverage . . . ." In addition, the plaintiff, quoting Misenti v. International Silver Co., 215 Conn. 206, 210, 575 A.2d 690 (1990), argues that"` ecause the Workers' Compensation Act is a remedial statute, this court should not impose limitations on the benefits provided for a disabled worker that the statute itself does not clearly specify.'" In Carriero v. Naugutuck, 243 Conn. 747, 707 A.2d 706 (1998), the plaintiff made a similar claim. The court in that case stated: "The plaintiff argues that our determination of the present case should be controlled by application of the interpretive axiom that, in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives of remedial legislation, the limitations on that legislation should be interpreted narrowly. It is true that this court has, in the past, found that axiom helpful in construing aspects of the Heart and Hypertension Act. See Szudora v. Fairfield, 214 Conn. 552, 559, 573 A.2d 1 (1990) ( n light of the remedial nature of the Heart and Hypertension Act, this court should not impose greater constraints on the benefits afforded to disabled police officers and firefighters than the legislature has chosen to adopt) . . . . Axioms such as this, however, cannot displace the need for careful and thoughtful interpretation of [the statutory provisions at issue], nor can they displace the firm conclusions that such a process of interpretation yields. [Such] axioms, like all rules or canons of statutory construction, serve as important guidelines to the determination of legislative meaning. To permit them to displace the conclusions t
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