 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Berryman12/28/2000
propriation was intentional, first, because "her prolonged failure to repay the duplicate fee tantamount to recklessness." Id. at 950. She refused to repay the duplicate sum despite repeated requests from the Probate Division. Second, Ms. Utley's misappropriation was deemed intentional because "each of three preapproval payments to herself was a deliberate act," and the third payment was made to herself despite the Probate Division's requests to return the prior payments. Id.
Next, we turn to the pertinent negligent misappropriation cases which were decided after Addams, supra, and resulted in a sanction of suspension, instead of disbarrment. The respondent in Choroszej, supra, represented a taxi driver in a claim for personal injuries. He received two settlement checks in connection with that representation, which he placed in his client trust account. A doctor who had treated the client had to be paid out of the settlement funds. The Board found that the respondent "genuinely believed that he had paid [the doctor] . . ." , id. at 435, but had not. The respondent called the doctor's office to ask about the bill. Although he was informed that the doctor's office would get back to him, the " espondent heard nothing further from the doctor's office, and respondent continued to hold an honest, but erroneous belief, that the doctor had been paid." Id. at 436. Thus, the attorney erroneously thought that the remainder of the funds in his client trust fund represented legal fees, and used those funds to pay business and personal expenses. After moving to Boston, the respondent learned that in fact the doctor's bill had not been paid, and subsequently, paid the $840 medical bill. Id. The Board concluded that the respondent's conduct was inadvertent and negligent. Id.
In Ray, supra, the respondent, who had never before probated an estate, assisted the client in the probate of an estate. Id. at 1383. In connection with that assistance, the respondent received a check for $20,763.70 resulting from the sale of stock. The check was made payable to the estate of the decedent. The respondent deposited the check into his escrow account, and sent a check in the amount of $18,263.00 to the client. He paid estate expenses and taxes, in the amount of $223.85, out of part of the remaining $2,500.70, and kept the rest for himself as his legal fee, without a court order. He maintained that he was unaware of the need for a court order before he could take his legal fee. Id. at 1384. The Hearing Committee found no "'clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] deliberately or recklessly attempted to deprive the estate of its funds.'" Id. at 1387. The Board also determined that the respondent's "conduct 'did not reach the level of recklessness, but that his misappropriation stemmed from no more than simple negligence.'" Id. at 1388.
The respondent in Reed, supra, also was inexperienced in the area in which the professional rules violation occurred. At the time the respondent agreed to handle her first personal injury case for a friend, the respondent had been in practice for less than two years and had specialized in criminal defense work. Id. at 507. The respondent's representation resulted in a settlement of $3,600, one-third of which represented her legal fee. After the respondent sent a check to the client, representing her share of the settlement, she had sufficient funds to pay two doctor's bills. However, one of the bills, for $435, was not paid. Believing she had paid the doctor's bill, the respondent used the remaining funds for other purposes, unrelated to her representation of the client. When the respondent discovered that there was no record of payment of the medical bill, she mailed a ch
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|