In re Berryman12/28/2000
showing of mitigating factors, the aggravating factors found by the Board, including the incident of knowing dishonesty . . . make clear his failure to overcome the presumption. Id. (quoting In re Robinson, 583 A.2d 691, 692 (D.C. 1990)).
Second, the Board's finding of Ms. Berryman's dishonesty and interference with the administration of justice, in violation of Rules 8.4 (c) and 8.4 (d), is indisputable, and separates her case, in large measure, from that of the respondent in Travers, supra. Unlike the respondent in Travers who sought the consent of the personal representative and the heirs before acting, Ms. Berryman refused to list Mr. Thorne as an interested party in Ms. Patterson's estate, or to include him in her service certifications to all parties in Ms. Patterson's probate matter, even though Mr. Thorne's attorney advised her that he was Ms. Patterson's lawful husband at the time of Ms. Patterson's death. Although she may well have been stunned and skeptical when Mr. Thorne resurfaced after an apparent absence of some thirty years from Ms. Patterson's life and refused to believe his status until presented with proof, nonetheless as an officer of the court, she had an obligation to list him as an interested party upon receiving the communications from his attorney. In addition, contrary to Ms. Berryman's initial explanation that she had the rental money orders in hand on May 30, 1993, prior to Ms. Patterson's death, the record is clear that she could not have received the money orders until June 14, 1993, when they were purchased. Furthermore, despite being an experienced probate attorney, and knowing that the rental money orders, the T. Rowe Price and the Pennzoil checks, all totaling $939.84, were made payable to Ms. Patterson, and thus, were presumptively part of Ms. Patterson's estate, nonetheless Ms. Berryman took these funds for herself, without court approval, and, unlike the respondent in Travers, supra, who made no attempt to conceal his actions, backdated the July 17, 1993 deposit slip, so that it appeared that the money orders and checks were received as of May 30, 1993, before Ms. Patterson's death. Although Ms. Berryman may have held a steadfast belief that the $939.84 belonged to her as part of Ms. Patterson's indebtedness to her, she should have recognized her obligation, as Personal Representative of Ms. Patterson's estate, to account for those funds, to list herself as a creditor of Ms. Patterson's estate, and to permit the court to resolve her claim. Instead, she placed herself ahead of all other creditors, without the approval of the Probate Division.
Accordingly, we are constrained to agree with the Board that Ms. Berryman engaged in intentional misappropriation, and that the appropriate sanction is disbarrment. Obviously, disbarrment may appear to be quite harsh in this case where Ms. Berryman previously enjoyed a twenty-four year career as an attorney without a single blemish, rendered extraordinary service to Ms. Patterson, even to the point of depositing her $30,000 legal fee, for persuading D.C. General Hospital to cancel Ms. Patterson's $499,000 indebtedness, in a joint account so that Ms. Patterson might use the funds to ease her own apparent cash flow problem, and took the $939.84 as part of Ms. Patterson's indebtedness to her. Nevertheless, we have stated previously that harshness does not overcome the presumption of disbarrment:
We recognize that "disbarrment in a case such as this may seem to be a harsh sanction when compared with sanctions for other violations involving arguably more egregious conduct." In re Micheel, supra, 610 A.2d at 236 (citations omitted). However, we are equally mindful that, "where client funds are involved, a more strin
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