 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Berryman12/28/2000
Berryman's] misconduct would not warrant disbarrment but for the Addams rule and suggest, as did Associate Judges Schwelb and Ruiz their concurring opinion in Pierson, 690 A.2d at 951, that the Addams rule is "too inflexible" and that this case presents a situation where the objectives of the disciplinary system would be fully met by a lengthy suspension.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Berryman challenges the findings and conclusions of the Board regarding all of the specified violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In essence, she maintains that rulings of the Probate Division are res judicata and support her contention that she has not engaged in misconduct; that Ms. Patterson owed her the balance of a $30,000 legal fee, and thus, she neither commingled nor intentionally misappropriated the sum of $939.84; and that Mr. Thorne had no interest in the Citizens Bank account; and that she achieved a substantial benefit for Ms. Patterson's estate by representing her in a personal injury action against the hospital which negligently injured her arm during dialysis treatment. She also maintains that, under this court's case law, disbarrment is not an appropriate sanction on this record. The Board, through Bar Counsel, argues that the disposition by the Probate Division is not a bar to disciplinary action against Ms. Berryman; that Ms. Berryman improperly designated herself as a beneficiary of Ms. Patterson's will; that she commingled and intentionally misappropriated funds from Ms. Patterson's estate; that her conduct was dishonest during the probate of Ms. Patterson's will; and that by her behavior, she seriously interferred with the administration of justice. On this record, and in light of this court's precedents, Bar Counsel maintains that disbarrment is appropriate.
Standard of Review
" he scope of our review of the Board's Report and Recommendation is limited." In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. 1996). D.C. Bar R. XI, ยง 9 (g) states in pertinent part:
In determining the appropriate order, the Court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted. See also In re Pierson, 690 A.2d 941, 946-47 (D.C. 1997).
Similarly, the Board is obliged to accept the hearing committee's factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole. In re Micheel, 610 A.2d 231, 234 (D.C. 1992) (citing In re Thompson, 583 A.2d 1006, 1008 (D.C. 1992)). However, while the Board "must defer to the 'subsidiary findings of basic facts,' which include such things as credibility determinations, made by the [Board's] fact-finding body (the hearing committee)[,] . . . . the Board owes no deference to the hearing committee's determination of 'ultimate facts,' which are really conclusions of law." Id. (citing Washington Chapter of the Am. Inst. of Architects v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 594 A.2d 83, 87 (D.C. 1991)). Thus, the Board owed no deference to the Hearing Committee's finding of negligent misappropriation. As we said in In re Micheel: "The 'finding' of negligence had a clear 'legal consequence': it directly affected the severity of the sanction to be imposed for concededly improper conduct. The Board therefore owed no deference to the hearing committee's conclusion that [the respondent] was merely negligent." Id. at 235 (footnote omitted). That we are faced with a legal question, which we review de novo, is clear from our decision in In re Utley: " hether
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|