Dodson v. Singing River Hospital System3/6/2003
s. 1996). That same day, Judge Harkey went to Heidelberg's office at Colingo Williams to discuss the Berry case and the recusal issue. While there, Joe Colingo, Heidelberg's partner, went into Heidelberg's office and made a remark that they would have to withhold contributions if Judge Harkey was going to recuse himself. Colingo Williams contends that this remark was made in jest; however, Dodson asserts that Colingo threatened Judge Harkey. A similar comment was made at a pretrial conference in a separate matter.
. Judge Harkey conducted a hearing on January 19, 2001, on Dodson's motion. Dodson called as witnesses several attorneys representing plaintiffs in other actions pending before Judge Harkey who filed motions to recuse him as well as calling members of Colingo Williams. Judge Harkey entered an order on April 9, 2001, denying Dodson's motion and concluding there was no appearance of impropriety and that recusal was not warranted.
DISCUSSION
WHETHER JUDGE HARKEY SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HIMSELF.
. The rule concerning disqualification of a judge in effect at the trial of this case was Canon 3, subdivision C, of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It states, "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . ." In conjunction with this canon, we have held consistently that the objective "reasonable person knowing all of the circumstances" is the proper standard by which we determine if a judge should have recused himself. Farmer v. State, 770 So. 2d 953, 956 (Miss. 2000); Tubwell v. Grant, 760 So. 2d 687, 688 (Miss. 2000); Beyer v. Easterling, 738 So. 2d 221, 228 (Miss. 1999); Walls v. Spell, 722 So. 2d 566, 571 (Miss. 1998); Garrison v. State, 726 So. 2d 1144, 1152 (Miss. 1998); Duplantis v. State, 708 So. 2d 1327, 1345 (Miss. 1998); Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 677 (Miss. 1997); Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d 770, 774 (Miss. 1997); Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 630 (Miss. 1996).
. It is clear that the standard for recusal is a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances. It is also clear that judges are presumed to be qualified and unbiased. Farmer, 770 So. 2d at 956; Upton v. McKenzie, 761 So. 2d 167, 172 (Miss. 2000); Tubwell, 760 So. 2d at 688; Norton v. Norton, 742 So. 2d 126, 131 (Miss. 1999); Beyer, 738 So. 2d at 228; Garrison v. State, 726 So. 2d 1144, 1152 (Miss. 1998); Evans, 725 So. 2d at 677; Walls v. Spell, 722 So. 2d 566, 571 (Miss. 1998); Duplantis, 708 So. 2d at 1345; Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 630; Green v. State, 631 So. 2d 167, 177 (Miss. 1994); Collins v. Joshi, 611 So. 2d 898, 901 (Miss. 1992).
. These cases are inconsistent regarding the burden of proving the presumption has been rebutted. We have held in numerous cases that the evidence presented must produce a reasonable doubt as to a judge's impartiality. Farmer, 770 So. 2d at 956; Tubwell, 760 So. 2d at 688; Beyer, 738 So. 2d at 228; Garrison, 726 So. 2d at 1152; Evans, 725 So. 2d at 677; Walls, 722 So. 2d at 571; Duplantis, 708 So. 2d at 1345; Hunter, 684 So. 2d at 630; Green, 631 So. 2d at 177. We have likewise held that the presumption is overcome only by showing "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the judge was biased or unqualified. Upton, 761 So. 2d at 172; Norton, 742 So. 2d at 131; Collins, 611 So. 2d at 901.
. Surely, it could not have been intended that the standard for recusal be so stringent as to warrant the criminal law "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. Quoting Turner, we stated in Collins that " o overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a 'reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption)." 611 So. 2d at 901. However, in the very next par
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