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Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co.12/27/2000
The question in this case is whether a financing practice that causes only monetary injury is a public hazard within the meaning of section 69.081, Florida Statutes (2000), the Sunshine in Litigation Act (the "Act"). We hold that such a practice is not a "public hazard" within the meaning of section 69.081(2) and affirm the trial court's order granting Ford Motor Credit Company's (FMCC) motion for summary judgment.
In 1992, appellant David Stivers brought suit against his former employer, a car dealership, and various other defendants, including FMCC. Stivers settled the lawsuit with FMCC in 1996. Before the settlement, Stivers had served as an expert witness in consumer lawsuits attacking credit practices pertaining to the sale and lease of automobiles.
As part of the February, 1996 settlement, Stivers received $55,000. Two paragraphs of the settlement agreement provided:
2. Plaintiff, DAVID STIVERS, shall not serve as an expert witness in any investigation, claim, law suit, or administrative action involving FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY;
3. DAVID STIVERS shall not directly or indirectly or by other means, discuss, identify or name FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, and/or its financing and leasing policies and procedures to any form of the media, whether print, broadcast or otherwise.
In spite of the settlement agreement, Stivers continued to serve as an expert witness in cases involving FMCC.
FMCC initiated an action to enforce the settlement agreement, alleging that Stivers continued to act as an expert witness against FMCC in violation of paragraph two of the agreement. The complaint sought injunctive relief.
In response, Stivers raised the affirmative defense that the settlement agreement was unenforceable since it violated the Act. Stivers counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the agreement violated the Act.
Ultimately, the trial court granted FMCC's motion for summary judgment, ruling that section 69.081 did not apply, since economic fraud in the leasing and financing of automobiles, which was the subject matter of Stivers' expertise, was not a "public hazard" within the meaning of section 69.081(2).
Stivers contends that the settlement agreement is unenforceable under section 69.081(4), which provides
ny portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.
Section 69.081(2) defines a "public hazard" as an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury.
The statute is broadly drafted. An "instrumentality" is commonly defined as a "means" or "agency." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 633 (1984). The statute gives examples of an "instrumentality" that expand the reach of the term to encompass a "person, procedure, product." The term "injury" is not defined or limited in any way. The legislature did not confine the definition of "injury" to cases involving personal injury or dangers to public health and safety. Compare Tex.R.Civ.Pro.Ann., Rule 76a (requiring a showing that sealing records will not adversely effect "the general public health or safety"); Va. Code Ann. ยง 8.01-420.01 (Michie Supp. 2000) (dealing with protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials relating t
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