 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Miller v. City of Red Lodge3/13/2003
laint against the City challenging the constitutionality of the City's dog ordinances and asserting due process, equal protection, double jeopardy, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 claims. On May 3, 2000, the District Court bifurcated Miller's actions against Culver and the City. This appeal addresses only those issues which pertain to Miller's suit against the City.
On October 3, 2000, the City filed a motion for summary judgment which argued that no material facts existed that entitled Miller to relief under any of the alleged theories for recovery. Following a hearing on the matter, the District Court, on December 5, 2000, granted the City's motion in part and denied it in part. The District Court granted the City's motion as to Miller's due process claim, equal protection claim, constitutional challenge to the City ordinances, and double jeopardy claim. However, the District Court concluded that material issues of fact did exist regarding the alleged §§ 1983 constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, the District Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment as it pertained to the §§ 1983 allegations.
On March 8, 2001, the City filed a second motion for summary judgment. This time, the City argued that it was immune from §§ 1983 liability pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. On April 27, 2001, Miller filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The District Court held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on May 2, 2001. On May 7, 2001, the District Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Miller's cross-motion for summary judgment. In granting the City's summary judgment motion, the District Court concluded that all of the public officials implicated in the action enjoyed immunity from suit. Therefore, by extension, the District Court concluded that "Miller's §§ 1983 action against the City fails as a matter of law by reason of the Doctrines of Judicial Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity."
On May 29, 2001, Miller filed a motion requesting the District Court to reconsider its summary judgment rulings. The District Court denied Miller's motion. Miller appeals from the District Court's May 7, 2001, order of summary judgment. Miller's appeal does not challenge the initial summary judgment ruling with respect to the due process, equal protection, double jeopardy, and statutory infirmity claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same evaluation under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., as the district court. Vivier v. State Dept. of Transp., 2001 MT 221, 5, 306 Mont. 454, 5, 35 P.3d 958, 5. This Court has stated that:
The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred. [Citations omitted.] Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903.
DISCUSSION
Did the District Court err when it granted the City's motion for summary judgment on the §§ 1983 claim pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity?
As indicated above, on January 21, 2000, Miller filed a third-party complaint against the City wherein she challenged the constitutionality of the City's dog ordinances and asserted due process, equal protection, a
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Montana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|