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Miller v. City of Red Lodge3/13/2003
nd §§ 1983 claims. On December 5, 2000, upon motion by the City, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the City on all but the §§ 1983 claim.
The District Court denied the City's summary judgment motion on the §§ 1983 claim because it found that the following material facts existed:
First, there are questions regarding whether Miller was deprived of a constitutional right. The question of whether the attempted removal of Mocha was unreasonable, in light of the facts alleged by Miller, must be answered by the jury.
Second, was it reasonable to substitute an ex parte Order to seize for a search warrant based upon probable cause? Third, does Red Lodge have an "unwritten policy" which results in the selective, retaliatory, enforcement of its dog ordinances as Miller alleges?
Fourth, whether the City's policy amounts to deliberate indifference to Miller's constitutional rights is also a fact question. Did the police officers act with deliberate indifference to Miller's privacy and due process rights when attempting to seize Mocha without a search warrant? Again, were their actions reasonable? The Court finds the question of liability of the City and its police officers mu be reached by the jury.
Finally, there are questions of fact as to whether the City's policy of allowing seizure of a dog through an ex parte Order rather than a search warrant, when a dog is on private property, is the underlying force behind the deprivation, if any, of Miller's due process rights. Also, if there is a policy of selective, retaliatory, enforcement of dog ordinances, did this lead to deprivation of Miller's constitutional rights? [Citations omitted.]
On March 8, 2001, the City filed another motion for summary judgment on the §§ 1983 claim. This time, the City argued that summary judgment was warranted because "the City, through the actions of its municipal employees, immune from suit under §§ 1983 pursuant to the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity." Essentially, the City maintained that the City Attorney's acts of filing the criminal complaint and moving to impound Miller's dog constituted "integral part of the judicial process." Therefore, pursuant to Imbler v. Pachtman (1976), 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, the City Attorney enjoyed an absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit. Next, the City argued that Judge Anderson acted within her "judicial capacity" and did not act "in clear absence of all jurisdiction" when she issued the ex parte order. Pursuant to Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331, the City argued that Judge Anderson enjoyed an absolute judicial immunity from suit. Finally, the City insisted that the police officers, in serving the order of seizure upon Miller, faithfully "executed a facially valid court order." Therefore, pursuant to Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Servs. (9th Cir. 1987), 834 F.2d 758, the police officers enjoyed an absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit. As all of the City's officials maintained immunity from suit, the City submitted that it too, by extension, enjoyed immunity. The City cited Reisdorff v. County of Yellowstone, 1999 MT 280, 296 Mont. 525, 989 P.2d 850, in support of its "immunity by extension" theory.
Based on the argument and authority submitted by the City in support of its second motion for summary judgment, the District Court recanted its initial statements regarding the §§ 1983 claim:
Upon careful review of the doctrines of judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity, in addition to [the officers'] depositions, the Court finds such "reasonableness" questions were improperly raised.
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