Miller v. City of Red Lodge3/13/2003
36. Based on the federal case law discussed below, we conclude that we erred in Reisdorff when we affirmed the summary judgment ruling on the §§ 1983 claim in favor of Yellowstone County and the City of Billings pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.
Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 provides in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (1978), 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, the United States Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local government units are "persons" for purposes of §§ 1983. To impose liability on a local government unit, a claimant must establish the following:
Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under §§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the §§ 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other §§ 1983 "person," by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. Stated another way, in evaluating a local government's §§ 1983 liability, courts must determine: (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the local government unit is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas (1992), 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1066, 117 L.Ed.2d 261. However, a municipality or local government unit cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality or local government unit cannot be held liable under §§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. A plaintiff must show that the local government action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the action and the deprivation of federal rights. Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County v. Brown (1997), 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626. " unicipal liability under §§ 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (1986), 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452.
Federal case law reveals that in approximately the mid 1970s, the Supreme Court embarked upon parallel tracts of §§ 1983 development-on the one hand it continued to cultivate the local government §§ 1983 liability, while, nearly simultaneously, it continued to expand upon immunities from §§ 1983 liability. In Owen, 445 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. at 1408, the Supreme Court noted the absence of exp
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