 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Rauch12/6/2000
diction under subsection (d). The fact remains, however, that the statute clearly and unambiguously does not require the family court to consider the subsection (c) factors when waiving jurisdiction under subsection (d). Accordingly, the family court's failure to expressly consider the subsection (c) factors does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
2. The family court did not violate principles of double jeopardy.
Rauch notes that this court has observed that "imposition of a requirement that in a waiver proceeding a minor must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have committed the offenses alleged would in all probability have the effect . . . of foreclosing subsequent criminal prosecution." In re John Doe, 61 Haw. at 53, 594 P.2d at 1088. Indeed, " he mere introduction of evidence for the purpose of showing by a preponderance that the minor committed the offenses alleged would cause jeopardy to attach," thereby precluding criminal prosecution as an adult in circuit court, and, consequently, " decision to waive jurisdiction would then become meaningless." Id. Rauch posits that the family court's utterance of the phrase "probable cause," particularly given the introduction into evidence of the police report, constituted a finding that "it was more likely than not [that she] committed murder in the second degree." Rauch urges this court, therefore, to hold that the family court subjected her to double jeopardy.
The family court, noting that it was aware of In the Interest of Doe, clarified its usage of the phrase "probable cause" at the hearing conducted with regard to Rauch's motion for reconsideration, explaining that it did not make a finding concerning Rauch's guilt or innocence but, rather, was remarking that the accusation appeared to be supported by the record. Indeed, inasmuch as HRS § 571-22(d)(1) requires the family court "find" that Rauch was alleged to have committed second degree murder, the family court is obligated to consider whether the charge is substantiated by the record, or, on the other hand, whether the prosecution has blatantly overcharged the matter in bad faith merely for the purpose of criminally prosecuting the minor in circuit court. Insofar as the context in which the family court remarked that the accusation appeared to be founded on "probable cause" clearly evinces that the family court was only addressing the substance of the charge, the family court's remark was neither a finding that Rauch had committed second degree murder nor a comment regarding her guilt or innocence at all.
With regard to the introduction of the police report, we note that it was not proffered for the purpose of establishing Rauch's guilt by a preponderance of the evidence; nor did the parties argue guilt or innocence at the waiver hearing. Accordingly, double jeopardy did not attach because the family court remarked that the accusation appeared to be grounded on probable cause, which the record reflects was intended by the court to mean that the charge was substantiated in the record.
B. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Sentencing Rauch.
1. Rauch was not entitled to time served credit for house arrest presentence detention.
Rauch asserts that the circuit court erred by not crediting her with time served under presentence house arrest. HRS § 706-623(2) provides in relevant part that, " hen a defendant who is sentenced to probation has previously been detained in any state or county correctional or other institution following arrest for the crime for which sentence is imposed, the period of detention following arrest shall be deducted from the term of imprisonment if the term is given as a con
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Hawaii Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|