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kline v. McGuire12/13/2000 y assert a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of when a reasonable person would have been put on inquiry notice to further investigate whether Richard's personality change was an "injury."
The common law discovery rule provides the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, both the facts of the injury and its cause. Borchard v. Anderson, 542 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1996). This rule specifically requires a plaintiff to know of the causal connection between an injury and a defendant's negligent act or omission before the limitations period begins to run. Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 268 (Iowa 1995).
In section 614.1(9), the legislature adopted a different discovery rule for medical malpractice actions due to the "high cost and impending unavailability of medical malpractice insurance." Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Iowa 1983). Our supreme court has upheld the constitutionality of the special limitation provision for such claims, finding the deferential treatment accorded health care providers was reasonably related to the legislature's goal of reducing malpractice premiums. Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Iowa 1986).
This case requires an analysis of the meaning of the word "injury" within the statute. We must determine whether the word "injury" within section 614.1(9) dictates the period of limitations began to run as soon as plaintiffs knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of Richard's depression and personality change. The uncontroverted record demonstrates the Kline family was aware of these symptoms shortly after Richard was discharged from the hospital in 1995. Richard's employer's records document Richard's sister, Pam Thompson, expressed concerns to the company in September of 1995 about her brother being "withdrawn and depressed since having surgery." Pam informed the employer at that time she had discussed the matter "with the family and they [were] concerned."
The question presented here is whether the word "injury" within the statute requires something more than mere knowledge of symptoms to put plaintiffs on inquiry notice. Plaintiffs contend their mere awareness of symptoms was insufficient to put them on inquiry notice because they had no reason before July of 1997, to believe the depression and personality change were related in any way to the medical treatment provided by the defendants.
Our supreme court has made it clear " he statute begins to run even though the patient does not know the physician . . . negligently caused the injury." Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Iowa 1995). The period of limitations does not begin to run until a patient knows or has reason to believe his injury was caused by a medical care provider's failure to meet the applicable standard of care. Plaintiffs do not contend, however, in this case the limitations period did not begin to run until they knew or should have known the defendants negligently treated Richard. They assert, instead, the period of limitations did not begin to run under section 614.1(9) until they knew or should have known the symptoms (depression and personality change) constituted an "injury." This requires, the plaintiffs contend, they must have at least known or had reason to know, of a causal connection between the symptoms (Richard's depression and personality change) and the 1995 medical treatment. Plaintiffs contend, moreover, awareness of depression and personality change after back surgery would not lead a reasonable person to immediately investigate whether such symptoms were caused by the medical treatment related
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